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The Effects of Eliminating the Work Search Requirement on Job Match 
Quality and Other Long-Term Employment Outcomes 
Marta Lachowska,* Merve Meral, and Stephen A. Woodbury 
Abstract 
We exploit data from the 1986–87 Washington Alternative Work Search experiment (merged
with nine years of follow-up administrative wage records) to estimate the causal effects of
eliminating the unemployment insurance (UI) work search requirement (WSR) on duration of
nonemployment, tenure with first post-claim employer, number of post-claim employers, long­
term earnings, employment, and hours worked. For UI claimants as a whole, we find that
eliminating the WSR had little influence, either positive or negative, on long-term post-claim
outcomes. In contrast, for permanent job losers, we find strong evidence that eliminating the
WSR had a negative effect on employment outcomes, resulting in a longer time to
reemployment, lower earnings, and a shorter duration of tenure with first post-claim employer.
For claimants who were not permanent job losers, eliminating the WSR resulted in more UI
benefit payments and longer unemployment durations, but made no difference for their
employment outcomes. We conclude that, in addition to reducing moral hazard associated with 
UI, the WSR is an important policy for improving the long-term employment outcomes of
permanent job losers. 
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1 Introduction
The work search requirement (WSR) for unemployment insurance (UI) recipients has been a 
central part of UI in the United States since the system began in the 1930s. Typically, to be
eligible for UI benefits, a claimant initially needs an adequate work history and must have lost
her job through lack of work and no fault of her own. In addition, to remain eligible, the worker
must be “able, available, and searching” for work—that is, must satisfy the work search
requirement, or WSR. 
Although the WSR aims to reduce the moral hazard associated with UI—that is, to 
counter the incentive to reduce job search effort and take longer to become reemployed—it may 
also pressure workers into accepting a relatively poor job match, leading to an unstable pattern of
employment and lower long-term earnings.1 Hence, eliminating the WSR could allow the
claimants to search for a better job match and lead to improved employment outcomes—the
improved job match hypothesis. Alternatively, eliminating the requirement could prolong
duration of unemployment, making the claimant less attractive to employers and hence worsen 
employment outcomes—the negative duration dependence hypothesis.2 Finally, eliminating the
work search requirement could impose greater costs to the UI system, without any effect on 
employment outcomes—the moral hazard hypothesis. 
Understanding the effects of the WSR on employment outcomes is of ongoing
importance because in recent years most states have relaxed enforcement of the requirement by 
shifting toward taking claims over the phone or on-line (see O’Leary [2006] and Ebenstein and 
1 A UI claimant does not need to accept the first available job offer, but he or she is required to accept a job offer
that satisfies the “suitable work” condition. In practice, claimants do not need to accept work that is not in line with
their training and experience. The work search requirement could nevertheless pressure a claimant to accept a less
attractive job offer that meets the suitable work condition instead of holding out for a better offer.
2 See, e.g., Notowidigdo, Kroft, and Lange (2013) for recent evidence of scarring effects of long spells of
unemployment.
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Stange [2010]). Because telephone and on-line claiming in effect reduces the frequency of in-
person contact between a claimant and the state workforce agency, it is important to know
whether a more “hands-off” approach to the WSR has any beneficial effect on post-
unemployment job match quality. 
The aim of this paper is to examine the effects of eliminating the WSR on post-
unemployment job match quality, proxied by employment tenure, and other long-term 
employment outcomes, such as duration of nonemployment, the number of post-claim 
employers, earnings, hours worked, and employment of UI claimants. To do this, we add nine
years of quarterly follow-up wage records to the original data from the Washington Alternative
Work Search (WAWS) experiment (Johnson and Klepinger 1991, 1994). In the WAWS
experiment, all eligible UI claimants at the Tacoma Employment Service Center between July
1986 and August 1987 were randomly assigned to a control group, which imposed a standard 
WSR, or to an exception reporting (ER) treatment group, which effectively eliminated the WSR. 
Claimants in the control group were told to contact at least three employers per week and 
be prepared to give evidence that they had done so in an eligibility review interview, usually
conducted 13–15 weeks after the initial claim. Claimants in the ER treatment group were told (at
the time of their initial claim) to actively seek work, but were also told that they would not be
called in for an eligibility review interview, and that weekly UI benefits would be mailed unless
they called the Tacoma Employment Service Center to report that they had stopped looking for
work or had taken a job. As such, ER amounted to an “honor system” with no WSR (Johnson 
and Klepinger 1991, pp. 3–9).
When studying the short-term effects of ER, Johnson and Klepinger (1991, 1994) find
that eliminating the WSR substantially increased benefits received, the duration of benefit
4
    
 
    
    
      
    
   




      
      
    
   
   
    
     
        
      
   





                                                          
receipt, and the probability of exhausting benefits, but without affecting earnings or hours
worked during the claim quarter or the benefit year. This combination of increased benefit
receipt without any changes in earnings or hours suggests that ER led to increased abuse of the 
UI system. At the same time, however, ER also increased the probability that a worker returned
to a former employer. Although this increased likelihood of return to a past employer suggests 
that relaxing the WSR may have been beneficial to at least some of the claimants (in that they
reestablished a previous job match), Johnson and Klepinger find no evidence of improved short-
term post-unemployment outcomes. On balance, then, Johnson and Klepinger’s findings suggest
that eliminating the WSR led to increased abuse of the UI system by claimants but did not lead to 
better employment outcomes. 
Other studies of the WSR arrive at quite different conclusions from the WAWS
experiment. For example, the evaluation of the 1994 Maryland UI Work-Search Demonstration
(Klepinger, Johnson, and Joesch 2002) concluded that although a relaxed enforcement of WSR
prolonged the duration of UI receipt, it also increased the probability of subsequent employment 
and led to higher earnings in the quarters following the experiment.3 Poe-Yamagata et al. (2011)
find that an increased emphasis on WSR under the 2005 Reemployment and Eligibility
Assessment initiative decreased the duration of UI receipt and had a positive impact on 
reemployment probability in the short-run. Finally, Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Deschênes (2005)
find that reducing the enforcement of the WSR did not lead to increased abuse of the UI system
by the claimants. Hence, the issue of whether a relaxed WSR leads to more abuse or has the 
3 The treatment resembling the WAWS’ ER treatment in the Maryland experiment only relaxed some aspects of
WSR. This treatment did not include automatic payments to the claimants. Instead, the claimants needed to inform
the UI office on a weekly basis that they had not found work and were actively searching. This treatment group was,
however, not required to report their employer contacts. In effect, the Maryland treatment relaxed some features of
the WSR, but did not eliminate it all together.
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positive effect of helping claimants obtain more stable and better paying post-unemployment
jobs remains a matter of debate.
Studying the long-term effects of eliminating the WSR is related to the more general
issue of how design of UI—e.g., the generosity and duration of benefits—affects earnings and 
employment. Thanks to the availability of high-quality microdata, this literature has expanded in
the recent decades. Addison and Blackburn (2000) and Tatsiramos and van Ours (2014) review
the literature on the relationship between UI benefit generosity and post-unemployment earnings. 
Both literature surveys conclude that the evidence has been mixed. For example, Ehrenberg and 
Oaxaca (1976), Burgess and Kingston (1976), McCall and Chi (2008), Caliendo, Tatsiramos, and 
Uhlendorff (2012), and Nekoei and Weber (2013) find a positive association between a more
generous UI system and reemployment earnings, whereas Addison and Portugal (1989), Gregory 
and Jukes (2001), and Schmider, von Wachter, and Bender (2012) find a negative association. 
Finally, some research has not found any convincing relationship between reemployment
earnings and either UI benefit generosity (Classen 1977; Belzil 2001) or longer potential
duration of UI benefits (Lalive 2007; Card, Chetty, and Weber 2007). 
A subset of this literature studies whether the design of UI has an impact on post-
unemployment job match quality, measured by job or employment tenure. The conclusions have 
varied. Belzil (2001), Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007), and van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) find 
little or no relationship between UI generosity and subsequent tenure, whereas Centeno (2004), 
Centeno and Novo (2009), and Tatsiramos (2009) conclude that a more generous UI leads to a 
longer post-unemployment tenure. 
Consequently, whether there is a link between various aspects of the UI system and post-
unemployment job-market outcomes remains unclear. The controversy is due, in part, to the lack
6
  
   
    
     
   
    
 
    
   
 
   
 







     
   
 
 
of long-term post-unemployment data that can be matched to the kind of exogenous variation 
necessary to identify a causal effect. Because the WAWS experiment randomly assigned a group 
of new UI claimants to a treatment that effectively eliminated the WSR, in this paper we are able 
to study the causal effect of eliminating the WSR on long-run outcomes. By using nine years of 
post-experimental quarterly earnings records, merged to data from a random-assignment 
experiment, we are able to address two main questions: “How does elimination of the WSR
affect the post-claim job match quality and long-term employment outcomes?” and “Does the 
effect vary by different groups of claimants?”
We address these questions by estimating regression models comparing the long-term 
outcomes of claimants assigned to the ER and control groups. We measure job match quality as
the duration of tenure with the first post-claim employer and we measure other long-term 
employment outcomes along several dimensions: the duration of nonemployment, the number of
post-unemployment employers, long-term earnings (and the volatility of those earnings), annual
probability of employment, and hours worked in the nine years following the experiment.
Because it seems likely the WSR may have different effects on different groups of
claimants, we estimate separate long-term effects for claimants who suffered permanent job loss, 
were temporarily laid off, quit for good cause, and were temporary or seasonal workers. We also
examine how relaxing the WSR might affect long-term unemployed claimants; we do this by
estimating the effects of ER separately for claimants with high and low probabilities of
exhausting their UI benefits.
The paper has the following main findings. Although, for UI claimants as a whole, we
find that the long-term employment outcomes of ER claimants were no different from outcomes
of the comparison group, we find significant differences among various subgroups.
7
     
  
    
   
  
   
    
  
    
   
  
        
    
   
   
 
  
    
   
    




For permanent job losers, eliminating the WSR resulted in clearly worse employment
outcomes: greater earnings losses in the year following job loss, a longer spell of
nonemployment, and shorter tenure with the first post-claim employer. In contrast, eliminating
the WSR had no impact on employment outcomes for workers who were not permanent job 
losers—those on a temporary layoff, quits, and contract or seasonal workers. That these
claimants claimed more benefits for a longer period of time, but had employment prospects no 
different than workers in the control group, is consistent with the interpretation that they
continued claiming benefits even after becoming reemployed. 
The results for claimants who were not permanent job losers imply that the WSR plays an 
important role in mitigating claimant moral hazard: without the WSR, these claimants would 
draw more UI benefits, but would not ultimately have improved employment outcomes. The
results also show that the WSR is an important policy for improving the welfare of permanent
job losers, who in absence of the WSR would have worse employment outcomes. As permanent
layoffs as a share of all layoffs have increased in the past 20 years (O’Leary, 2007), the findings
of this paper are relevant to policymakers concerned with the current reemployment prospects of
permanent job losers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the design of the 
Washington experiment, describes the intention-to-treat effects, and includes a discussion of the
effect of eliminating the WSR on returning to a former employer. Section 3 describes the 
methods for estimating the long-term effects and differences in long-term effects for various
subgroups. Section 4 presents the results, and section 5 summarizes the findings and concludes. 






    
  
      
    
    
     
   
   
   
    
  
     
  
 
     
   




and details of how we created a long-term panel, as well as sample definitions, to a Data 
Appendix. 
2 Exception Reporting and the Washington Alternative Work
Search Experiment
The main purpose of the WAWS experiment was to test alternative means of reducing the 
duration of UI receipt and unemployment duration. To be eligible for UI in Washington, a
claimant must have worked at least 680 hours in roughly the year before claiming UI, must have
been laid off for lack of work and through no fault of her own, and must be “able, available, and
searching” for work. This last criterion for UI eligibility is the work search requirement (WSR).
In order to fulfill the WSR in Washington, the Employment Security Department personnel tell
the claimants to contact at least three employers per week and to be prepared to give evidence 
that they have done so in an eligibility review interview, which may be conducted 13–15 weeks
after the claimant files for benefits. For an eligibility review interview, a claimant reports to the
public Employment Service for a one-hour group “interview” (or lecture) followed by (in some
cases) a 15-minute individual interview during which employer contacts are checked. 
The WAWS experiment tested the effects of eliminating this WSR by randomly
assigning new UI claimants to a control group (subject to the standard WSR) and an ER
treatment group. The latter were told (at the time of their initial claim) to actively seek work, but 
also that they would not be called in for an eligibility review interview (so they did not need to 
keep a record of job search contacts), and that weekly UI benefits would be mailed unless they
called the Tacoma Employment Service Center to report they had stopped looking for work or
had taken a job. In effect, ER amounted to an honor system with no WSR (Johnson and 
9
    
 
  
   
  
      
   
      
 
     
     




    
      
    
       




                                                          
Klepinger 1991, pp. 3–9). Random assignment occurred between July 1986 and August 1987 at
the Tacoma Employment Service Center, based on the last digit of each claimant’s Social 
Security number (see the Data Appendix for details).
2.1 Sample definition
Because the follow-up administrative wage records available to us begin in the first quarter of 
1987, we do not have data on earnings, hours, and employer information for the first post-claim 
quarter for those who claimed in the third quarter of 1986 (that is, July, August, and September). 
Because of this data limitation, the sample we use is smaller than the sample studied by Johnson 
and Klepinger (1991, 1994); the Data Appendix provides details on how we define our analysis
sample. 
The experiment also tested a policy alternative called a “new work search” (NWS)
policy, similar to the standard WSR except that selected claimants were called for an eligibility
review interview earlier than usual (in week 6 after the claim rather than week 13–15 and at
discretion of the UI office) and received a detailed job development plan (see Johnson and 
Klepinger [1991, p. 4]).4 Since there is considerable variation between the states in the 
implementation of the eligibility review interview (see O’Leary [2006]), the NWS policy
treatment could conceivably be a “standard” WSR in another state. As we document in Tables 3
below and in Table A1 in the Results Appendix, we argue that because the NWS policy differed 
little from the standard WSR in Washington at the time and because there is no evidence that
4 The WAWS experiment also included an “intensive services” treatment, in which claimants were assigned to job
search assistance (see Johnson and Klepinger [1991]). We study the long-term effects of this treatment in Cebi,
Lachowska, and Woodbury (2014).
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NWS policy affected outcomes, we can treat the NWS policy group as an alternative control
group, and hence increase the sample size by pooling the NWS policy group with the controls.5
Table 1 offers a profile of how the different treatments worked in practice by showing 
proportions of the control, ER, and NWS policy groups that were called for an eligibility review
interview and received various employment services. Two points are worth noting. First, almost 
none of the ER claimants were subjected to an eligibility review interview, consistent with the 
design of the treatment. ER claimants were also less likely to receive employment services,
especially those requiring some initiative on the part of the claimant, such as assistance with a
job development plan. The main services provided to ER claimants were job referral and
placement, which are typically initiated by the Employment Service.
Second, Table 1 shows that when compared to the control group, the NWS policy group 
was more likely to receive an eligibility review interview and a job development plan, both likely
due to the earlier scheduling of an eligibility review interview and the additional emphasis placed 
on a job development plan for claimants assigned to this group (see Johnson and Klepinger
[1991, pp. 3–9]). Otherwise, the claimants assigned to the control and NWS groups received a 
similar mix of employment services (that is, job consultation, receipt of or referral to training, 
testing, support services, contacting an employer on the claimant’s behalf, or any other contact
with the Employment Service), suggesting that this treatment was effectively very similar to the 
standard WSR experienced by the controls.6
5 In Table A1 in the Results Appendix, we show that there is no statistically significant difference in any of the
short-term outcomes between the control and the NWS policy groups. In Tables A2–A9 in the Results Appendix, we
show that our conclusions regarding the effect of ER on job-match quality and other long-term outcomes are 
unchanged if we limit the estimation sample to only include the ER and control groups (N = 3,145). Together, these 
findings strengthen our rationale for pooling the NWS policy group together with the control group.
6 The differences between NWS policy group and the controls in the receipt of these six employment services were 
not statistically significant. 
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Since neither we nor Johnson and Klepinger (1991, 1994) find evidence that the NWS
policy had a differential impact on outcomes when compared to the control group, we pool the
control group together with the NWS policy group as a way to increase the size of our analysis
sample. We refer to this larger, pooled control group as the comparison group.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 displays various mean characteristics of the control, ER, and NWS policy groups, and 
the differences among them. The characteristics can be classified as
•	 demographic — sex, race, age, schooling, veteran status, marital and household
status
•	 pre-claim — earnings and hours in the three prior years; industry and occupation
before the claim; whether the individual had a prior UI claim
•	 claim-related — reason for job loss, whether the claimant had a recall date or was
placed through a union hiring hall, UI benefits and claim type, and reservation
wage
In general, the randomization protocol appears to have been successful, although there is
evidence of nonrandomness between the controls and ER groups for some observables, for 
example, the distribution of age, schooling, industry, and reason for job loss across the groups. 
Also, relatively few ER group claimants were on standby or in a union that referred claimants to 
jobs. Johnson and Klepinger (1991, 1994) suggest that this difference is a matter of reporting
rather than actual status: because claimants in the ER group did not need to submit continued 
claims for UI, the UI staff had no incentive to record the standby or union status of claimants in 
this group. A baseline survey completed by claimants (reported in Johnson and Klepinger [1994, 
12
   
    
      
        
    
       
       
   
    
      
 
  
    
 
  
   
 
    
    
 





p. 704] but not available to us) supports the claim and shows no difference between the groups in
the proportion on standby or placed by a union. Nonetheless, the measurable differences between
the control and ER groups offer a rationale for regression-adjustment in comparing the groups.
Because the difference between control and ER groups could be due, in part, to using a
smaller sample than Johnson and Klepinger (1991, 1994), in Table 2 we make additional
comparisons of mean characteristics of the control group with the NWS policy group and of the 
ER group with a pooled sample of the control group and the NWS group (i.e., the comparison 
group). We note two things. First, randomization into the control and NWS groups appears to 
have been successful. Second, for only 3 characteristics out of 60 shown are the differences
between claimants assigned to ER and the pooled control and NWS group with a p-value < 0.05. 
2.3 Replication of Johnson and Klepinger’s main results
Table 3 replicates the estimated effects of the ER treatment on various short-term outcomes
considered by Johnson and Klepinger (1994). We group the outcome variables into two 
categories: 1) variables pertaining to UI receipt (total UI benefits paid, weeks of UI payments, 
and proportion that exhausted UI benefits); and 2) variables pertaining to short-term post-claim 
employment outcomes (proportion employed, hours worked, earnings, and proportion who 
returned to previous employer or industry). Each cell in the third and fourth columns from the
left is a point estimate and a standard error from a separate regression. We will follow this
convention throughout the paper. 
Like Johnson and Klepinger (1994), we find that, on average, claimants in the ER group 
received more UI benefits (an additional $445 in Table 3), received benefits for an additional 3 
weeks, and were more likely to exhaust their benefits (by about 11 percentage points) compared 
13
    
     
   
 
  
    
 
   
    
      
 
      
  
      
    
  
   
       
   
 
   
      





                                                          
with the comparison group. Also like Johnson and Klepinger, we find no statistically significant
difference between the ER and comparison groups in hours worked or earnings in year 0 (the 
benefit year) or year 1 (the subsequent year).
On one hand, these findings suggest that eliminating the WSR may have led to abuse of
the system by the claimants—the ER group received more UI benefits than the comparison 
group, but their earnings and work hours did not fall relative to the comparison group. It would 
seem that claimants in the ER group may have returned to work without informing the UI
agency, and hence continued to receive benefits to which they were not entitled. 
On the other hand, the estimates in Table 3 suggest that the ER group had a marginally
lower probability of employment in the first post-claim quarter and in the year of the experiment.
That the total earnings and hours of ER claimants in year 0 and 1 did not fall in spite of this
lower probability of reemployment suggests that the ER claimants who did become reemployed 
could have worked at higher wages than the comparison group. This interpretation is consistent 
with the findings in Johnson and Klepinger (1994), who impute hourly wages using a Heckman 
selection-correction model and find that hourly wages increased for ER claimants (we do not
attempt to impute hourly wages).7 This potential hourly wage gain for ER claimants who were 
reemployed suggests they may have found better job matches. This interpretation is also
consistent with the finding that ER claimants had almost a 3 percentage-point higher likelihood 
of returning to a former employer than the comparison group. 
7 Johnson and Klepinger (1994) find higher imputed hourly wages for ER claimants, but unlike us, they do not find a
statistically significant decrease in the probability of reemployment. Our finding appears to be in part due to pooling
together the NWS policy group and the control group. When comparing the claimants assigned to ER and the
control group, the decrease in the probability of employment during the first year is negative, but not statistically
different from zero. In Table A1, we show that the NWS policy group had a higher probability of reemployment in
the first post-claim quarter (by about 0.5 percentage points) and in the year of the experiment (by about 0.8 
percentage points) than the controls, but this gain is not statistically significant. Pooling the NWS policy group and
the control group increases the average reemployment probability sufficiently to explain the statistically negative
effect in Table 3.
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Together, these findings suggest that eliminating the WSR may have improved the
employment prospects of some claimants by allowing them more time to establish (or
reestablish) a successful job match and earn higher wages. In section 4, we address this issue
further by studying whether ER resulted in any long-term job match quality gains, and if so, for
what type of claimant.
2.4 Post-claim employment outcomes
The administrative wage records allow us to follow each claimant’s post-experiment 
employment, earnings, and hours for nine years. Because administrative wage records also
include quarterly information about each claimant’s employer account number (EAN), we 
construct post-claim employment outcomes not considered by Johnson and Klepinger (1991, 
1994). First, for each claimant, we compute the number of unique employers (identified by
EANs) we observe from the first quarter after the initial claim to the last follow-up quarter in 
which we can observe every claimant. We refer to this variable as number of post-claim
employers. Figure 1 presents a histogram of the number of employers for the comparison group 
and the ER group. Table 5 shows the mean, median, and the standard deviation of this variable. 
Second, we construct the variable quarters of nonemployment by computing the number
of consecutive post-claim quarters in which a claimant is observed without covered earnings. 
This variable allows us to examine whether ER resulted in an increase in the time to
reemployment beyond what we can infer from UI claims records that can only measure duration 
of insured unemployment. Figure 2 shows the distribution of this variable. 
Third, we measure the volatility of post-claim earnings by standard deviation of earnings






    
  
 
       
 
    
   
   
    
         
  
         
      
      
    
 
    
  
   
 
 
Finally, we construct a proxy for post-claim job match quality. For each claimant, we 
compute the number of quarters in which a claimant is observed with earnings from the first 
post-claim employer. This variable ranges from 0, if no EAN is observed, to 40, if the claimant is
with the same EAN throughout our window of observation. We refer to this employment tenure 
variable as quarters with first post-claim employer. Figure 3 shows the distribution of this
variable.
3 Methods
In order to estimate the effect of ER on post-unemployment outcomes, we merge the WAWS
experimental data on each claimant (derived from UI claims records, administrative wage
records, and Employment Service records) with quarterly administrative records on the
claimant’s employment, earnings, and hours worked in the 40 quarters following the claim 
quarter (and the enrollment in the experiment). 
The effect of assignment to the ER treatment group on outcomes can be obtained by
pooling the comparison group (consisting of the control and NWS policy groups) and ER group
and estimating linear models of the following form:
yi = α + βERi + Xiγ + ui, (1)
where yi is an outcome for individual i in any of the years following enrollment in the
experiment; ERi is an indicator for assignment to the ER group (that is, the group not subject to 
the WSR); Xi includes all of the variables listed in Table 2, as well as the unemployment rate in
the county where the claim was filed and indicators for the quarter the individual claimed 
benefits; and ui denotes i’s unobservable traits. 
The identifying assumption is that assignment to treatment indicator is independent of




     
     
     
   
   
 
    
  
   
 
   
   
      
    
   
     
     




Johnson and Klepinger (1994) note, because the random assignment to control and ER treatment 
groups appears to have succeeded, this assumption is reasonable. In this case, the ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimator of β is a consistent estimator of the intention-to-treat effect on outcome
y. Including the demographic variables (X) reduces sampling error and controls for observable
differences between treatment and control groups that may arise even under random assignment. 
The outcomes (y) include the claimant’s post-experiment employment, earnings, hours, 
quarters with first post-claim employer, number of post-claim employers, quarters of 
nonemployment, and standard deviation of earnings. By estimating a model for each of the nine
years following enrollment in the experiment, we can trace out the path of long-term effect of
assignment to the ER group on hours, earnings, and probability of employment. For the 
remaining outcomes—number of post-claim employers, quarters of nonemployment, standard 
deviation of earnings, and quarters with first post-claim employer—we also estimate linear
models. Since the first three outcomes listed above are count variables, we have also estimated
Poisson maximum-likelihood models. Our findings remain qualitatively unchanged.
Taken together, all these outcomes capture different, but not necessarily independent
dimensions of the effect of assignment to ER. If, according to the improved job match hypothesis, 
eliminating the WSR prolonged the duration of unemployment, but had a beneficial effect on
post-claim outcomes, we would expect the estimate of β to have a positive effect on post-claim 
hours, earnings, employment, and the number of quarters with the first post-claim employer. On
the contrary, if eliminating the WSR only prolongs the unemployment spell, then, according to
the negative duration dependence hypothesis, we would expect the estimate of β to have a
negative effect on post-claim hours, earnings, employment, and the number of quarters with the 
first post-claim employer.
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The effect of ER on the remaining outcomes—quarters of nonemployment, number of
post-claim employers, and standard deviation of earnings—is more ambiguous and ought to be
considered jointly with the estimated effect on other outcomes. For example, if ER did not have
any effect on the level of post-claim earnings but at the same time had a negative effect on the 
volatility of post-claim earnings, it could be argued that ER had a beneficial effect, since, on 
average, claimants assigned to ER are earning just as much but experience less variability. 
Analogously, a longer duration of nonemployment and fewer post-claim employers should be 
interpreted jointly with the effect on post-claim earnings of ER claimants, since it is difficult to
interpret the effect of ER on these outcomes in isolation.
3.1 Effect of ER by reason for job loss
In order to study whether the effects of eliminating the WSR are different for claimants on 
permanently laid off than for claimants who lost their jobs for other reasons, we estimate 
separate models by five mutually exclusive reasons for job loss: 1) quit for reasons satisfying the 
standard for “good cause,” 2) lost job permanently, 3) temporary layoff, 4) contract
ended/seasonal layoff, and 5) lost job for reasons unknown. The Data Appendix explains in 
detail how we created these indicators. 
We estimate Equation (1) for each of the five reasons for job loss, where each model
compares outcomes for claimants assigned to ER who lost their jobs due to a given reason to 
claimants in the control group who lost their job for the same reason. Since reason for job loss is
pre-determined with respect to treatment assignment, the coefficient on the ER indicator yields
an intention-to-treat effect of eliminating the WSR for a given reason-for-job-loss category of 
claimants.
18
   
  
      
    
     
   
   
  
     
    









        
    
   
       




                                                          
3.2 Effect of ER by likelihood of benefit exhaustion 
In order to study whether the long-term unemployed benefit from the elimination of the WSR,
we study claimants with a high and low probability of exhausting benefits separately. In practice,
we construct an ex ante probability of benefit exhaustion. First, using a probit, we estimate a 
likelihood of benefit exhaustion over the comparison group sample. To estimate the probit, we
include all of the variables in Table 2, plus the unemployment rate in the county and month the
claim was filed and quarter of claim in the conditioning set. Second, we assign the predicted
likelihood values to all the claimants in the analysis sample.8 We define a claimant as “high 
probability” if the claimant’s ex ante probability of exhausting benefits is higher than the
comparison group average, which equals 26.4 percent.9 We define a claimant as “low 
probability” if the claimant has an ex ante probability that is lower than the comparison group 
average.
3.3 Threats to validity
Since WAWS is a random-assignment experiment, it has high internal validity. However,
external validity might be compromised if the inferences and conclusions cannot be generalized 
from the population and setting in which they are studied to other populations and settings. We
believe that external validity of the study is reasonably high, as the state of Washington is not an 
outlier with respect to the characteristics of its population. As Johnson and Klepinger (1994)
note, the UI practices implemented in the state of Washington at the time of the demonstration
8 This bears similarities to estimating a worker profiling score; see Berger et al. (1997) and Berger et al. (2000).
9 In order to increase the number of observations and avoid colinearity problems, we estimate the likelihood model
using the pooled NWS policy group and control group for all the quarters of the experiment. The mean of value of
exhausted benefits is 26.4 percent in this sample, which is slightly higher than the mean value in Table 3, where it is 
23.1 percent. Table A10 in the Results Appendix shows the estimated coefficients for the model predicting benefit
exhaustion.
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(that is, the standard WSR that the claimants assigned to the control group were subject to) did 
not deviate from the approach used in most other states at that time. It is also worthwhile to note
that the average unemployment rate in Tacoma, the location of WAWS experiment, was at the 
time about 7.9 percent. Therefore, the estimated effects pertain to relatively slack labor market
conditions, a setting that makes our findings of current interest. 
Another concern regarding external validity is whether compliance with the experimental
protocol is specific to a given demonstration. In the case of ER, the issue of noncompliance
(opting out of treatment) is not really a concern because the ER treatment is in the form of
information and instructions supplied to claimants when they file for benefits. That is, the
treatment does not include a follow up, and hence the possibility of noncompliance as would be
the case with a training program or job search assistance.
A potential threat to external validity is whether turning a temporary and local
experimental program into a permanent and widespread policy might change the economic
environment in such a way that the conclusions from the smaller-scale experiment cannot be 
generalized. For example, in the permanent absence of the WSR, more workers might be induced 
to enter the UI system, thus changing the composition of the pool of claimants from that studied 
in the original WAWS demonstration. This would reduce the external validity of the experiment. 
Finally, we discuss attrition from our long-term panel and the reliability of our follow-up 




    
       
 
  
      
    
     
    
  





    
      
    
     
   
    
   
  
    
 
 
Table 4 reports the estimated long-term effect of assignment to ER on the probability of
employment, hours worked, and total earnings in each of the nine years following enrollment in
the WAWS experiment. In order for the treatment effects to be interpreted as deviations from the
comparison group mean, we present the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group to 
the left of the β estimate. Except for the 2 percentage point lower probability of employment in 
the year of the experiment, ER did not have a statistically significant effect on employment in the
other post-experimental years, nor did it have an effect on hours worked or earnings. 
Table 5 reports the estimated effect of assignment to ER on the other post-claim long­
term employment outcomes: the number of post-claim employers, quarters of nonemployment, 
the standard deviation of subsequent earnings, and our proxy for job match quality—quarters
with the first post-claim employer. As in the previous table, we present the mean and standard 
deviation of the comparison group to the left of each estimated coefficient. Since Figures 1–3 
imply that some of these variables have a long right-tail, we also present the comparison-group 
median. 
On average, a claimant in the comparison group spent about two years with the first post-
claim employer, but the median tenure equals only three quarters. Rounding down the mean, we 
see that the mean and the median number of post-claim employers in the 40 quarters following
the experiment equals four. The median number of quarters of nonemployment equals one
quarter, while the mean equals about 3.6 quarters. 
Turning to the β coefficient, we see that the point estimates in Table 5 suggest that ER
prolonged the duration of nonemployment but also increased tenure with first employer, reduced
the number of post-claim employers, and reduced the volatility of earnings. However, all the
point estimates in Table 5 are small, and no point estimate is statistically different from zero. In
21
      




    
        
    
    
    
   
     
    
     
 
    
  
    
    
      
 
     
   
     





                                                          
sum, the results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that for UI claimants as a whole, eliminating the WSR
did not have a statistically significant effect on any employment outcome in the nine years
following the experiment. 
4.2 The effect of ER by reason for job loss
In order to see if the effect of ER on outcomes differs depending on reason for job loss, in Table 
6, each row presents the estimated effect of ER on a selected outcome, by reason for job loss.
Table 7 complements Table 6 by presenting the mean and standard deviation of each outcome
for each reason-for-job-loss category for the claimants in the comparison group. 
Turning to the effect of ER on UI receipt outcomes (total UI benefits paid, weeks of UI
payments, and whether a claimant exhausted benefits), we see that the estimates in Table 6 are 
numerically similar to the estimates from Table 3.10 For every reason for job loss category, the 
ER claimants received between about $410 and $510 more in total UI benefits, for about 3–4 
weeks longer, and were about 10 percentage points more likely to exhaust benefits than 
claimants in the comparison group. 
Caution must be exercised when comparing the results across the groups in Table 6, as
the comparison group baseline average is different depending on reason for job loss; see the 
means of outcomes of the comparison group in Table 7.11 Taking these differences into account, 
it turns out that, relative to the comparison group average, the increase in total UI benefits paid 
and weeks of UI payments is similar across the reason for job loss categories; however, the
10 To save space, we present only benefit year outcomes and not both benefit year and first spell outcomes, as in 
Table 3. 

11 For example, claimants who are unemployed due to a permanent job loss are more likely to be female, white,
 
college educated, and work more in finances and services compared to the entire sample of UI claimants in WAWS. 

They are also likely to have had a prior UI claim. Claimants temporarily laid off are on the other hand more likely to
 
be male, younger, less likely to have a college degree, but more likely to work in construction or manufacturing.
 





     
   
   
   
       
  
     
  
  
      
 
   
   
   
   
     
   
     
   
    
  
  




                                                          
likelihood of benefit exhaustion for ER claimants on temporary layoff is strikingly 79 percent
higher (that is, 0.108/0.136). The likelihood of exhausting benefits is 40–52 percent higher for
ER claimants who became unemployed for other reasons. 
Turning to the year 0 employment outcomes (in Table 6), we see that ER claimants who 
were permanently laid off had lower chances of employment, worked fewer hours, and had lower
total earnings compared to comparison claimants laid off permanently. This decrease is,
however, only transitory: by year 1, the outcomes for the ER claimants were statistically
undistinguishable from the comparison group.12 The temporary negative effect on employment
outcomes during the year of the experiment is consistent with the ER claimants taking almost 1.5
quarters longer to find employment than the baseline average of 4.2 quarters or (see Table 7). It
appears that the longer duration of insured unemployment resulted in a longer duration of
nonemployment. In Table 6, we also see that ER claimants who were permanently laid off had a 
shorter tenure with their first post-claim employer by about 1.65 quarters. This suggests that the
first job match of permanently laid off claimants assigned to ER was less successful than the first
job match of permanently laid off claimants in the comparison group. 
The effect of ER claimants on temporary layoff is very different. We see that the only
statistically significant employment outcome effect is a decrease in the number of post-claim 
employers. We also see that ER claimants on temporary layoff had a 4.4 percentage point higher
probability of returning to a previous employer, but this effect is not statistically significant (t­
value is 1.42). Overall, the marginally improved probability of returning to a former employer
and the reduction in job changing following ER did not lead to long-term gains in earnings or
employment.
12 Also in later years the employment outcome differences are not statistically different from zero; we do not show
this in Table 6 to conserve space.
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Interestingly, the largest group, the claimants who lost their jobs for reasons unknown to 
us, had higher total earnings in year 1, experienced a shorter duration on nonemployment by 
almost a quarter, and were more likely to return to their pre-claim employers by 4.7 percentage
points. This is intriguing, as this is the only group in Table 6 for which there is a statistically
significant effect on return to same employer. Initially, we expected that the increase in the 
probability of return to same employer reported in Table 3 would be explained by a higher
probability of return by claimants placed on recall. However, as Table 6 shows, this effect is 
driven by the group whose reasons for unemployment are unknown to us. 
Other than a higher probability of return to former industry for ER claimants who were 
seasonal or contract workers, for the claimants in the remaining category, claimants who quit, 
ER did not have a statistically different effect on any employment outcomes. 
4.3 The effect of ER by likelihood of benefit exhaustion
In Table 8, we show the long-term effects of assignment to ER on the probability of
employment, hours worked, and earnings during the nine years following enrollment in the
experiment for claimants likely to exhaust their benefits, i.e., claimants whose predicted
likelihood is higher than the comparison-group average. We see that in year 0, ER claimants had
a 4.4 percentage point lower likelihood of reemployment than claimants in the comparison 
group. We also see a negative effect on employment in year 3 but not in the years before and 
after, which may question how much stock we can put on this finding. There is no statistically
significant effect on any of the other employment outcomes, hours worked and earnings.
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In Table 9, we present the results for claimants statistically unlikely to exhaust benefits. 
We see that the outcomes for these ER claimants were not statistically different from the
outcomes of claimants assigned to the comparison group. 
Finally, in Table 10 we show the effect of ER for claimants with both high and low
probability of exhausting benefits on the remaining employment outcomes: number of post-claim 
employers, quarters of nonemployment, standard deviation of earnings, quarters with the first
post-claim employer, and the likelihood to return to a former employer and former industry.
Except for an increase in the probability to return to a former employer for ER claimants unlikely
to exhaust benefits, in no remaining case is the effect of ER statistically different from zero.
5 Discussion and Summary
A longstanding concern about strict enforcement of the UI work search requirement (WSR) is 
that it may pressure unemployed job seekers to accept a job “too soon,” reducing job match 
quality and long-term earnings. In addition to being undesirable for workers this could be
detrimental to employers, many of whom value long-term relationships and are willing to pay
higher wages to encourage long tenure; see Farber (1999). 
The Washington Alternative Work Search experiment tested the effects of eliminating the 
WSR by randomly assigning new UI claimants to a control group and to an “exception
reporting” (ER) honor system in which claimants were told to search actively for reemployment
but were also told their benefits would be sent to them unless they told the UI agency that they
had found a job or had stopped looking for work. By appending nine years of administrative
wage records to the original data from the experiment, we are able to examine the long-term 
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effects of ER—that is, the effects on employment tenure, number of post-claim employers, 
employment, hours, and earnings. 
In the short term, ER increased the duration of UI benefit receipt, benefits received, and 
the probability of exhausting benefits. Although it also increased the probability that a worker
would return to a former employer, which could be a positive outcome, in the long-term, (that is, 
in the nine years following the experiment), ER had no effect on earnings, hours worked, or
other employment outcomes. We also find no evidence of a statistically significant effect of ER
on time to reemployment, post-claim employment tenure, number of post-claim employers, or
volatility of earnings. Overall, then, ER increased claimant moral hazard and the costs to the UI
system without observable gains for workers.
We also study the effects of ER by reason for unemployment, and find differences among 
different groups of claimants. First, eliminating the WSR was harmful in the short run for
claimants who lost their job as a result of a permanent layoff, consistent with negative duration 
dependence. During the year of the experiment, these claimants experienced lower probability of
reemployment, worked fewer hours, and had lower earnings. Moreover, in the long term, these 
claimants were reemployed about 1.4 quarters later then the comparison group and experienced
shorter job tenure with their first post-claim employer by 1.65 quarters. Both of these effects are 
economically large and imply strongly that the WSR is a policy that benefits UI claimants who 
were permanently laid off.
Second, it appears that eliminating the WSR led to more abuse of the UI system by all 
groups of claimants who were not permanent job losers—claimants who quit, claimants on
temporary layoff, or claimants who were contract or seasonal workers. For these claimants, ER
led to more benefit payments, a longer spell of insured unemployment, and a higher likelihood of
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exhausting benefits. However, the probability of reemployment, the number of hours worked, 
and earnings for these claimants were no different from those assigned to the comparison group
(who were subject to the WSR). This implies that eliminating the WSR led to increased claimant 
moral hazard—UI benefits drawn were greater, but for the ER claimants who were not
permanent job losers, the employment outcomes were no different than for claimants subjected
to the standard WSR. 
Overall, eliminating the WSR was costly to the UI system without convincingly
improving employment outcomes for any claimant category considered. The clear conclusion for
policy is that the WSR is an important tool for improving outcomes of permanent job losers and 
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Eligibility Review Interviews and Employment Services Received by Control, Exception Reporting, and New












(1) and (2)* 
(5) 
Difference between
(1) and (3)* 
job referral/placement 
job development plan 
other employment serviceb 






















Sample size 1,539 1,606 1,073 
Source: Author's tabulations of the Washington Alternative Work Search experimental data, from UI claims records,
 
administrative wage records, and Employment Service records. See the Data Appendix for details.
 




* p -value for test of difference of means.
a. A claimant may receive more than one category of services.
b. Job consultation, receipt of or referral to training, testing, support services, job development (contacting an employer on 










Characteristics of Control, New Work Search, and Exception Reporting Groups 
New Work
Covariate Exception Difference1 New Work Difference1 Search and Exception Difference1 
Control Reporting (p -value) Control Search (p -value) Control Reporting (p -value) 
Male 0.718 0.717 0.935 0.718 0.713 0.779 0.716 0.717 0.958 
Race 
white 0.819 0.828 0.488 0.819 0.829 0.479 0.823 0.828 0.677 
black 0.097 0.099 0.885 0.097 0.087 0.350 0.093 0.099 0.521 
other 0.084 0.073 0.252 0.084 0.084 0.996 0.084 0.073 0.201 
Age 
≤ 24 0.218 0.210 0.592 0.218 0.192 0.111 0.207 0.210 0.833 
25-34 0.389 0.404 0.394 0.389 0.391 0.909 0.390 0.404 0.367 
35-44 0.240 0.207 0.029 0.240 0.222 0.285 0.232 0.207 0.058 
45-54 0.103 0.111 0.459 0.103 0.129 0.040 0.113 0.111 0.804 
≥ 54 0.051 0.068 0.042 0.051 0.066 0.093 0.057 0.068 0.154 
Schooling 
less than high school 0.159 0.123 0.004 0.159 0.148 0.471 0.154 0.123 0.004 
high school 0.537 0.566 0.099 0.537 0.542 0.774 0.539 0.566 0.088 
some college 0.225 0.240 0.303 0.225 0.242 0.298 0.232 0.240 0.535 
college graduate 0.080 0.071 0.343 0.080 0.067 0.220 0.075 0.071 0.657 
Veteran 0.196 0.190 0.654 0.196 0.215 0.235 0.204 0.190 0.264 
Marital status/gender 
married male 0.270 0.264 0.721 0.270 0.242 0.116 0.258 0.264 0.688 
married female 0.099 0.094 0.609 0.099 0.096 0.772 0.098 0.094 0.670 
Household status 
no dependents 0.309 0.329 0.212 0.309 0.322 0.485 0.314 0.329 0.296 
1 dependent 0.155 0.148 0.546 0.155 0.169 0.360 0.161 0.148 0.250 
2 or more dependents 0.236 0.229 0.626 0.236 0.207 0.081 0.224 0.229 0.731 
homeowner 0.286 0.285 0.934 0.286 0.253 0.067 0.273 0.285 0.399 
Pre-claim earnings ($) 
1 year before 13,841 13,559 0.436 13,841 13,531 0.447 13,713 13,559 0.632 
2 years before 11,900 11,571 0.417 11,900 11,639 0.563 11,793 11,571 0.538 











Covariate Exception Difference1 New Work Difference1 Search and Exception Difference1 
Control Reporting (p -value) Control Search (p -value) Control Reporting (p -value) 
1 year before 1334 1313 0.376 1334 1286 0.073 1314 1313 0.938 
2 years before 1101 1064 0.178 1101 1076 0.414 1091 1064 0.271 
3 years before 946 931 0.599 946 964 0.583 954 931 0.382 
Occupation 
professional 0.105 0.102 0.772 0.105 0.106 0.936 0.106 0.102 0.714 
clerical 0.122 0.133 0.379 0.122 0.116 0.661 0.120 0.133 0.222 
sales 0.058 0.059 0.933 0.058 0.050 0.407 0.055 0.059 0.605 
service 0.101 0.101 0.988 0.101 0.123 0.073 0.110 0.101 0.357 
agric., fishery, forestry 0.026 0.028 0.726 0.026 0.021 0.455 0.024 0.028 0.436 
processing 0.038 0.033 0.420 0.038 0.035 0.698 0.037 0.033 0.481 
machine trades 0.086 0.090 0.700 0.086 0.107 0.066 0.095 0.090 0.594 
benchwork 0.046 0.048 0.811 0.046 0.049 0.700 0.047 0.048 0.944 
structural work 0.266 0.265 0.910 0.266 0.274 0.667 0.270 0.265 0.728 
miscellaneous 0.151 0.143 0.486 0.151 0.116 0.011 0.137 0.143 0.614 
Industry 
agriculture 0.025 0.025 0.969 0.025 0.021 0.588 0.023 0.025 0.749 
mining 0.001 0.001 0.539 0.001 0.001 0.785 0.001 0.001 0.590 
construction 0.205 0.196 0.520 0.205 0.190 0.338 0.199 0.196 0.816 
manufacturing 0.237 0.232 0.778 0.237 0.263 0.125 0.247 0.232 0.267 
transportation, utilities 0.038 0.054 0.028 0.038 0.034 0.577 0.036 0.054 0.005 
wholesale trade 0.070 0.060 0.237 0.070 0.048 0.023 0.061 0.060 0.845 
retail trade 0.159 0.158 0.938 0.159 0.158 0.994 0.158 0.158 0.934 
finance, ins., real estate 0.028 0.031 0.597 0.028 0.031 0.674 0.029 0.031 0.706 
services 0.174 0.172 0.866 0.174 0.172 0.909 0.173 0.172 0.896 
government 0.045 0.057 0.135 0.045 0.054 0.318 0.049 0.057 0.240 
unclassified 0.018 0.014 0.390 0.018 0.027 0.129 0.022 0.014 0.083 
Prior UI claim 
none 0.804 0.804 0.969 0.804 0.791 0.408 0.799 0.804 0.701 
duration ≤ 15 weeks 0.104 0.100 0.688 0.104 0.106 0.852 0.105 0.100 0.584 
duration > 15 weeks 0.092 0.097 0.638 0.092 0.103 0.353 0.096 0.097 0.964 
Reason for job loss
permanent layoff 0.172 0.153 0.149 0.172 0.157 0.291 0.166 0.153 0.280 
temporary layoff with recall date 0.231 0.265 0.027 0.231 0.253 0.179 0.240 0.265 0.073 












Covariate Exception Difference1 New Work Difference1 Search and Exception Difference1 
Control Reporting (p -value) Control Search (p -value) Control Reporting (p -value) 
quit 0.172 0.000 0.697 0.172 0.167 0.719 0.170 0.000 0.533 
Employer-attached/placed by union2 0.355 0.286 0.000 0.355 0.371 0.418 0.362 0.286 0.000 
UI benefits/claim type 
weekly amount ($) 146 145 0.564 146 145 0.640 146 145 0.686 
maximum amount ($) 3,868 3,830 0.529 3,868 3,849 0.776 3,860 3,830 0.576 
potential duration 26.0 25.9 0.887 26.0 26.0 0.875 26.0 25.9 0.810 
replacement rate (percent)3 61.7 61.6 0.841 61.7 61.4 0.733 61.6 61.6 0.961 
combined wage claim4 0.049 0.044 0.492 0.049 0.045 0.635 0.047 0.044 0.597 
ex-service member claim 0.034 0.035 0.868 0.034 0.034 0.923 0.034 0.035 0.890 
federal employee claim 0.009 0.018 0.031 0.009 0.014 0.241 0.011 0.018 0.060 
Reservation wage (hourly) 
≤ $5.00 0.190 0.181 0.479 0.190 0.175 0.325 0.184 0.181 0.770 
$5.01–$7.00 0.151 0.164 0.294 0.151 0.142 0.519 0.147 0.164 0.129 
$7.01–$10.00 0.138 0.161 0.065 0.138 0.157 0.180 0.145 0.161 0.165 
$10.01–$20.00 0.143 0.130 0.272 0.143 0.138 0.717 0.141 0.130 0.296 
> $20.00 0.110 0.106 0.719 0.110 0.117 0.581 0.113 0.106 0.491 
Sample size 1,539 1,606 1,539 1,073 2,612 1,606 
Notes:  Universe consists of exception reporting, control and new work search groups during fall 1986, winter 1987, and spring 1987.
Source: Author's tabulations of the Washington Alternative Work Search experimental data. 
1. Bold denotes p -values for the test of mean differences between groups < .05.
2. Claimants were not required to search for work if they were on layoff with a set recall date or if they were placed through a union hiring hall. 
3. The replacement rate is the weekly benefit amount as a percentage of average weekly earnings before the UI claim.











Effect of Exception Reporting on Selected Outcomes as Deviations from the Comparison Group




Outcome Mean (Std.Dev.) Coefficient (Std. error) 
UI Receipt Outcomes 
Benefit year 
Total UI benefits paid ($) 1,956 (1728) 451*** (47) 
Weeks of UI payments 14.18 (10.5) 3.26*** (0.31) 
Exhausted benefits (proportion) 0.231 (0.422) 0.114*** (0.014) 
First spell
Total benefits in first UI spell ($) 1,638 (1636) 445*** (48) 
Weeks of first UI spell 13.58 (10.58) 3.43*** (0.33) 
Employment Outcomes 
First quarter outcomesa 
Employed (proportion) 0.695 (0.46) -0.032** (0.014) 
Hours worked 201.3 (210) -7.3 (6.1) 
Total Earnings ($) 2,285 (2676) -84 (71) 
Year 0 outcomesa 
Employed (proportion) 0.89 (0.313) -0.020* (0.010) 
Hours worked 1016 (746) -29.0 (21.7) 
Total Earnings ($) 11,617 (10143) -277 (253) 
Year 1 outcomesa 
Employed (proportion) 0.843 (0.364) -0.005 (0.011) 
Hours worked 1134 (838) 0.9 (25.2) 
Total Earnings ($) 13,122 (11210) 321 (305) 
Other outcomes 
Returned to same employer (proportion) 0.322 (0.467) 0.029** (0.013) 
Returned to same industry (proportion) 0.441 (0.497) 0.019 (0.014) 
Sample size 4,218 
Notes:  Universe consists of exception reporting, control, and new work search groups during fall 1986,
winter 1987, and spring 1987. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Regression-adjusted differences control for all variables displayed in Table 2 plus the quarter in which the 
claim was filed and the unemployment rate in the county and month in which the claim was filed. 
a. First quarter is the quarter following the claim quarter. Year 0 is defined as the sum of the first, second,
third, and fourth quarter after the claim quarter. Year 1 is defined as the sum of the fifth, sixth, seventh, and 






Effect of Exception Reporting on Long-Term Employment, Hours, and Earnings as Deviations from the Comparison Group 
Outcome Proportion employed Hours worked Total Earnings ($) 
Comparison ComparisonException Reporting Exception Reporting Comparison group Exception Reporting
group group 
Mean (Std. dev.) Coeff. (Std. error) Mean (Std. dev.) Coeff. (Std. error) Mean (Std. dev.) Coeff. (Std. error) 
Year relative to claim 
Year 0 0.890 (0.313) -0.020* (0.010) 1,016 (746) -29.0 (21.7) 11,617 (10,143) -277 (253) 
Year 1 0.843 (0.364) -0.005 (0.011) 1,134 (838) 0.9 (25.2) 13,122 (11,210) 321 (305) 
Year 2 0.810 (0.393) -0.008 (0.012) 1,133 (867) -13.2 (25.9) 13,828 (12,014) -180 (329) 
Year 3 0.776 (0.417) -0.015 (0.013) 1,104 (883) 7.0 (26.8) 13,615 (12,204) -114 (350) 
Year 4 0.741 (0.438) -0.011 (0.014) 1,038 (886) 4.6 (27.0) 13,199 (12,714) -96 (364) 
Year 5 0.713 (0.452) -0.007 (0.014) 992 (897) 29.3 (27.5) 12,728 (12,752) 349 (368) 
Year 6 0.681 (0.466) 0.005 (0.014) 942 (912) 27.0 (27.7) 12,001 (12,925) 304 (368) 
Year 7 0.659 (0.474) 0.003 (0.014) 932 (922) 9.8 (28.0) 11,621 (12,674) 445 (374) 
Year 8 0.637 (0.481) -0.003 (0.015) 891 (915) 6.7 (28.1) 11,442 (12,918) 415 (387) 
Year 9 0.624 (0.484) -0.001 (0.015) 913 (943) 1.7 (28.6) 11,780 (13,532) 280 (401) 
Sample size 4,218 4,218 4,218 
Notes: See annotations to Table 3.
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 Table 5 
Effect of Exception Reporting on Selected Long-Term Employment Outcomes as Deviations from the 
Comparison Group 
Comparison group Exception Reporting 
Mean Median (Std. dev.) Coeff. (Std. error) 
Outcome 
Number of post-claim employers 4.68 4 (3.78) -0.13 (0.11) 
Quarters of nonemployment 3.63 1 (8.34) 0.12 (0.25) 
Std. deviation of post-claim earnings ($) 5,850 5,253 (3,965) -70 (115) 
Quarters with first post-claim employer 8.05 3 (10.85) 0.23 (0.33) 
Sample size 4,218 
Notes:  See annotations to Table 3. Number of post-claim employers is defined as the number of unique 
employers we observe from the first quarter after the claim until the last quarter. Quarters of nonemployment 
is defined as the number of consecutive post-claim quarters without covered earnings. Std. deviation of
earnings is defined as the standard deviation of earnings in the nine years following the claim. 
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Effects of Exception Reporting on Selected Outcomes by Reason for Job Loss as Deviations from the Comparison Group 
Reason for Job Loss 







UI Receipt Outcomes 
Benefit year outcomes 
Total UI benefits paid ($) 456*** 491*** 416*** 518*** 485*** 
(117) (118) (102) (120) (93) 
Weeks of UI payments 3.99*** 3.64*** 2.93*** 3.33*** 3.18*** 
(0.81) (0.82) (0.65) (0.77) (0.61) 
Exhausted benefits (proportion) 0.117*** 0.157*** 0.108*** 0.096*** 0.123*** 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.025) (0.036) (0.027) 
Employment Outcomes 
Year 0 outcomes 
Employed (proportion) -0.048 -0.072** -0.011 -0.006 0.004 
(0.030) (0.028) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021) 
Hours worked -56.9 -105.2* 14.5 -34.5 -25.6 
(60.0) (58.9) (41.3) (53.0) (42.4) 
Total Earnings ($) -450 -1,701** -419 -27 408 
(583) (663) (526) (709) (477) 
Year 1 outcomes 
Employed (proportion) -0.036 -0.050 0.004 0.007 0.018 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.020) (0.028) (0.023) 
Hours worked -45.4 -36.8 56.5 -11.2 16.7 
(65.0) (65.4) (51.1) (63.5) (50.4) 
Total Earnings ($) -499 -673 46 1,066 1,264** 
(699) (778) (626) (822) (595) 
Other post-claim outcomes 
Number of post-claim employers -0.14 0.08 -0.40* 0.18 -0.23 
(0.27) (0.30) (0.21) (0.36) (0.21) 
Quarters of nonemployment 0.55 1.44** 0.29 0.22 -0.99* 
(0.76) (0.71) (0.39) (0.59) (0.51) 
Std. deviation earnings ($) -248 -7 -125 -351 327 
(276) (293) (235) (311) (229) 
Quarters with first post-claim employer -0.83 -1.65** 1.21 0.49 0.88 
(0.70) (0.77) (0.75) (0.91) (0.68) 
Returned to same employer (proportion) 0.001 -0.017 0.044 0.058 0.047* 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.031) (0.039) (0.027) 
Returned to same industry (proportion) -0.027 -0.044 0.045 0.070* 0.038 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.030) (0.041) (0.028) 
Sample size 729 679 1,052 653 1,105 




Mean and Standard Deviation (in parentheses) of Outcomes of the Comparison Group by Reason for Job Loss 
Reason for Job Loss 







UI Receipt Outcomes 
Benefit year outcomes 
Total UI benefits paid ($) 1,857 2,322 1,685 2,244 1,867
 (1,763)  (1,813)  (1,580)  (1,751)  (1,710) 
Weeks of UI payments 14.2 16.9 12.1 15.4 13.7
 (11.2)  (11.2)  (11.2)  (11.2)  (11.2) 
Exhausted benefits (proportion) 0.273 0.316 0.136 0.236 0.235
 (0.446)  (0.466)  (0.343)  (0.425)  (0.424) 
Employment Outcomes 
Year 0 outcomes 
Employed (proportion) 0.849 0.868 0.944 0.924 0.862
 (0.358)  (0.338)  (0.23)  (0.266)  (0.345) 
Hours worked 860 920 1,228 978 1,005
 (779)  (738)  (710)  (690)  (751) 
Total Earnings ($) 8,083 9,651 15,300 13,437 10,721
 (8,514)  (9,586)  (10,954)  (10,698)  (9,071) 
Year 1 outcomes 
Employed (proportion) 0.806 0.829 0.885 0.874 0.819
 (0.396)  (0.377)  (0.319)  (0.332)  (0.385) 
Hours worked 1,005 1,117 1,293 1,099 1,103
 (848)  (819)  (847)  (764)  (857) 
Total Earnings ($) 10,085 11,715 16,185 14,949 12,118
 (9,694)  (10,482)  (12,288)  (11,638)  (10,462) 
Other post-claim outcomes 
Number of post-claim employers 4.59 4.52 4.51 5.62 4.43
 (3.5)  (3.69)  (3.5)  (4.4)  (3.77) 
Quarters of nonemployment 4.60 4.20 2.21 2.85 4.38
 (9.42)  (9.15)  (5.49)  (6.99)  (9.63) 
Std. deviation earnings ($) 5,229 5,640 6,212 6,668 5,576
 (3,754)  (4,153)  (3,842)  (4,161)  (3,873) 
Quarters with first post-claim employer 6.39 7.40 9.31 8.13 8.32
 (9.33)  (10.7)  (11.52)  (10.77)  (11.12) 
Returned to same employer (proportion) 0.151 0.127 0.52 0.347 0.359 
(0.358) (0.333) (0.5) (0.477) (0.48) 
Returned to same industry (proportion) 0.286 0.273 0.616 0.48 0.463 
(0.452) (0.446) (0.487) (0.5) (0.499) 
Sample size 729 679 1,052 653 1,105 













Effect of Exception Reporting on Long-Term Employment, Hours, and Earnings for Claimants with a Higher than Average Predicted
Likelihood of Benefit Exhaustion 
Outcome Proportion employed Hours worked Total Earnings ($) 
Comparison Exception Exception
Comparison group Exception Reporting group Reporting Comparison group Reporting 
(Std. (Std. (Std. Mean (Std.dev.) Coeff. Mean (Std.dev.) Coeff. Mean (Std.dev.) Coeff. 
error) error) error) 
Year relative to claim 
Year 0 0.834 (0.372) -0.044** (0.020) 805 (744) -45.1 (37.7) 8838 (8807) -452 (453) 
Year 1 0.794 (0.405) -0.013 (0.021) 964 (832) 6.3 (43.6) 10688 (10086) 314 (555) 
Year 2 0.759 (0.428) -0.020 (0.023) 956 (851) 5.1 (44.4) 11278 (11189) -199 (588) 
Year 3 0.729 (0.445) -0.054** (0.024) 942 (864) 18.7 (46.0) 11072 (11543) 29 (609) 
Year 4 0.673 (0.469) -0.022 (0.025) 869 (875) 36.7 (46.5) 10480 (11972) 184 (630) 
Year 5 0.627 (0.484) -0.013 (0.025) 818 (892) 45.0 (46.8) 9882 (11626) 720 (629) 
Year 6 0.608 (0.489) -0.013 (0.026) 772 (884) 44.0 (46.3) 9092 (11523) 861 (615) 
Year 7 0.578 (0.494) -0.006 (0.026) 755 (902) 37.6 (47.1) 8689 (11137) 884 (610) 
Year 8 0.545 (0.498) 0.006 (0.026) 720 (885) 20.0 (46.6) 8549 (11353) 817 (627) 
Year 9 0.539 (0.499) 0.004 (0.026) 757 (919) -3.7 (48.1) 8826 (11712) 844 (665) 
Sample size 1,543 1,543 1,543 
Notes:  See annotations to Table 3.
 
The comparison group consist of claimants in the control and new work search groups with a higher than average probability of exhausting benefits.
 
The average probability of exhausting benefits equals 0.264.
 
Table 9 
Effect of Exception Reporting on Long-Term Employment, Hours, and Earnings for Claimants with a Lower than Average Predicted
Likelihood of Benefit Exhaustion 
Outcome Proportion employed Hours worked Total Earnings ($) 
Comparison Exception Exception
Comparison group Exception Reporting group Reporting Comparison group Reporting 
(Std. (Std. (Std. Mean (Std.dev.) Coeff. Mean (Std.dev.) Coeff. Mean (Std.dev.) Coeff. 
error) error) error) 
Year relative to claim 
Year 0 0.921  (0.27) -0.007 (0.011) 1132  (721) -27.0 (29.1) 13153  (10502) -449 (416) 
Year 1 0.87  (0.336) -0.004 (0.014) 1228  (827) -8.9 (33.4) 14467  (11571) 144 (472) 
Year 2 0.838  (0.369) -0.005 (0.015) 1231  (860) -28.2 (34.3) 15237  (12224) -288 (488) 
Year 3 0.803  (0.398) 0.006 (0.016) 1194  (881) 0.5 (34.9) 15022  (12335) -225 (498) 
Year 4 0.779  (0.415) -0.006 (0.017) 1131  (879) -14.5 (34.7) 14702  (12865) -292 (507) 
Year 5 0.761  (0.427) -0.006 (0.017) 1089  (885) 16.5 (35.7) 14302  (13074) 48 (516) 
Year 6 0.722  (0.448) 0.012 (0.018) 1035  (914) 12.2 (36.3) 13609  (13372) -67 (515) 
Year 7 0.704  (0.457) 0.003 (0.018) 1030  (918) -8.2 (36.6) 13243  (13175) 200 (530) 
Year 8 0.687  (0.464) -0.013 (0.019) 985  (918) -5.5 (37.0) 13042  (13445) 181 (550) 
Year 9 0.671  (0.47) -0.009 (0.019) 1000  (945) -2.0 (37.5) 13413  (14182) -37 (562) 
Sample size 2,675 2,675 2,675 
Notes: Same as above.
 
The comparison group consist of claimants in the control and new work search groups with a lower than average probability of exhausting benefits.
 












Effect of Exception Reporting on Long-Term Employment Outcomes by Varying Likelihood of Exhausting Benefits 
Sample 
Probability of exhausting benefits
higher than averagea 
Probability of exhausting benefits
lower than averageb 
Outcome 












Number of post-claim employers 
Quarters of nonemployment 
Std. deviation of post-claim earnings ($) 
Quarters with first post-claim employer 
Returned to same employer (proportion) 

















































Sample size 1,543 2,675 
Notes:  See annotations to Table 3.
a. The comparison group consist of claimants in the control and new work search groups with a higher than average probability of exhausting
benefits. The average probability of exhausting benefits equals 0.264.
 
b.The comparison group consist of claimants in the control and new work search groups with a lower than average probability of exhausting
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Effect of New Work Search on Selected Outcomes as Deviations from the Control Group 
Control group New Work Search 
Outcome Mean (Std. dev.) 
Coefficient
(Std.error) 
UI Receipt Outcomes 
Benefit year 
Total UI benefits paid ($) $1,978 (1731) -50 (60) 
Weeks of UI payments 14.13 (10.40) 0.07 (0.40) 
Exhausted benefits (proportion) 0.227 (0.419) 0.007 (0.016) 
First spell
Total benefits in first UI spell ($) $1,654 (1642) -34 (59) 
Weeks of first UI spell 13.48 (10.46) 0.15 (0.41) 
Employment Outcomes 
First quarter outcomesa 
Employed (proportion) 0.692 (0.462) 0.005 (0.018) 
Hours worked 199.8 (212) 1.2 (7.9) 
Total Earnings ($) $2,285 (2,786) -16 (88) 
Year 0 outcomesa 
Employed (proportion) 0.888 (0.316) 0.008 (0.012) 
Hours worked 1014 (751) 5.3 (27.3) 
Total Earnings ($) $11,701 (10,400) -135 (314) 
Year 1 outcomesa 
Employed (proportion) 0.847 (0.360) -0.005 (0.014) 
Hours worked 1138 (823) -7.7 (31.7) 
Total Earnings ($) $13,304 (11,315) -326 (373) 
Other outcomes 
Returned to same employer (proportion) 0.316 (0.465) 0.008 (0.017) 
Returned to same industry (proportion) 0.428 (0.495) 0.021 (0.018) 
Sample size 2,612 
Notes:  Universe consists of new work search and control groups during fall 1986, winter 1987, and 
spring 1987. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Regression-
adjusted differences control for all variables displayed in Table 2 plus the quarter in which the claim
was filed and the unemployment rate in the county and month in which the claim was filed.
a First quarter is the quarter following the claim quarter. Year 0 is defined as the sum of the first,
second, third, and fourth quarter after the claim quarter. Year 1 is defined as the sum of the fifth,










Effect of Exception Reporting on Selected Outcomes as Deviations from the Control Group 
Control group Exception Reporting 
Outcome Mean (Std. dev.) Coefficient (Std.error) 
UI Receipt Outcomes 
Benefit year 
Total UI benefits paid ($) $1,978 (1731) 429*** (54) 
Weeks of UI payments 14.13 (10.40) 3.27*** (0.35) 
Exhausted benefits (proportion) 0.227 (0.419) 0.116*** (0.015) 
First spell
Total benefits in first UI spell ($) $1,654 (1642) 424*** (54) 
Weeks of first UI spell 13.48 (10.46) 3.47*** (0.37) 
Employment Outcomes 
First quarter outcomesa 
Employed (proportion) 0.692 (0.462) -0.027* (0.016) 
Hours worked 199.8 (212) -6.0 (7.0) 
Total Earnings ($) $2,285 (2,786) -84 (82) 
Year 0 outcomesa 
Employed (proportion) 0.888 (0.316) -0.015 (0.011) 
Hours worked 1014 (751) -23.1 (24.7) 
Total Earnings ($) $11,701 (10,400) -315 (290) 
Year 1 outcomesa 
Employed (proportion) 0.847 (0.360) -0.006 (0.013) 
Hours worked 1138 (823) -0.7 (28.4) 
Total Earnings ($) $13,304 (11,315) 186 (342) 
Other outcomes 
Returned to same employer (proportion) 0.316 (0.465) 0.035** (0.015) 
Returned to same industry (proportion) 0.428 (0.495) 0.031* (0.016) 
Sample size 3,145 
Notes:  Universe consists of exception reporting and control groups during fall 1986, winter 1987, and 
spring 1987. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Regression-
adjusted differences control for all variables displayed in Table 2 plus the quarter in which the claim was
filed and the unemployment rate in the county and month in which the claim was filed.
a First quarter is the quarter following the claim quarter. Year 0 is defined as the sum of the first,
second, third, and fourth quarter after the claim quarter. Year 1 is defined as the sum of the fifth, sixth,
seventh, and eighth quarter after the claim quarter. Earnings are expressed in 1988:4 prices.
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Table A3 
Effect of Exception Reporting on Long-Term Employment, Hours, and Earnings as Deviations from the Control Group 
Outcome Proportion employed Hours worked Total Earnings ($) 
Control group Exception Reporting Control group Exception Reporting Control group Exception Reporting 
Mean (Std. dev.) Coeff. (Std. error) Mean (Std. dev.) Coeff. (Std. error) Mean (Std. dev.) Coeff. (Std. error) 
Year relative to claim 
Year 0 0.888  (0.316) -0.015 (0.011) 1,014  (751) -23.1 (24.7) 11,701  (10,400) -315 (290) 
Year 1 0.847  (0.36) -0.006 (0.013) 1,138  (823) -0.7 (28.4) 13,304  (11,315) 186 (342) 
Year 2 0.817  (0.386) -0.013 (0.014) 1,140  (858) -19.8 (29.0) 14,154  (12,266) -488 (372) 
Year 3 0.781  (0.414) -0.017 (0.015) 1,100  (881) 17.2 (30.1) 13,778  (12,416) -209 (396) 
Year 4 0.749  (0.434) -0.014 (0.015) 1,044  (889) 8.9 (30.4) 13,503  (12,977) -284 (413) 
Year 5 0.728  (0.445) -0.016 (0.015) 1,002  (893) 31.2 (30.7) 12,993  (12,832) 207 (414) 
Year 6 0.686  (0.464) 0.006 (0.016) 953  (920) 22.3 (31.3) 12,204  (12,990) 196 (418) 
Year 7 0.667  (0.471) 0 (0.016) 960  (925) -7.5 (31.5) 12,075  (12,941) 136 (424) 
Year 8 0.643  (0.479) -0.005 (0.016) 904  (916) 5.2 (31.6) 11,800  (13,127) 220 (438) 
Year 9 0.63  (0.483) 0 (0.017) 923  (943) 4.9 (32.3) 12,115  (13,817) 127 (456) 
Sample size 3,145 3,145 3,145 





Effect of Exception Reporting on Selected Long-Term Employment Outcomes as Deviations from the Control
Group 
Control group Exception Reporting 
Mean Median (Std. dev.) Coeff. (Std. error) 
Outcome 
Number of post-claim employers 4.73 4  (3.79) -0.14 (0.13) 
Quarters of nonemployment 3.60 1  (8.24) 0.08 (0.28) 
Std. deviation of post-claim earnings ($) 6,026 5,407  (4,074) -214* (130) 
Quarters with first post-claim employer 7.79 3  (10.6) 0.40 (0.37) 
Sample size 3,145 
Notes:  See annotations to Table A2. Number of post-claim employers is defined as the number of unique employers we 
observe from the first quarter after the claim until the last quarter. Quarters of nonemployment is defined as the number of
consecutive post-claim quarters without covered earnings. Std. deviation of earnings is defined as the standard deviation of








Effects of Exception Reporting on Selected Outcomes by Reason for Job Loss  as Deviations from the Control
Group 










UI Receipt Outcomes 
Benefit year outcomes 
Total UI benefits paid ($) 541*** 444*** 307*** 472*** 510*** 
(133) (134) (116) (142) (104) 
Weeks of UI payments 4.66*** 3.46*** 2.14*** 3.35*** 3.38*** 
(0.92) (0.92) (0.74) (0.91) (0.68) 
Exhausted benefits (proportion) 0.142*** 0.156*** 0.086*** 0.088** 0.134*** 
(0.042) (0.044) (0.028) (0.042) (0.030) 
Employment Outcomes 
Year 0 outcomes 
Employed (proportion) -0.036 -0.058* -0.002 -0.006 0.004 
(0.034) (0.031) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) 
Hours worked -91.7 -94.0 58.0 -9.6 -14.7 
(70.1) (68.0) (46.9) (58.6) (48.7) 
Total Earnings ($) -597 -1,631** -17 91 123 
(673) (758) (591) (875) (545) 
Year 1 outcomes 
Employed (proportion) -0.028 -0.059* 0.016 0.001 0.005 
(0.037) (0.034) (0.024) (0.032) (0.025) 
Hours worked -36.6 -36.3 61.3 -29.9 7.1 
(73.8) (72.4) (58.9) (70.7) (57.7) 
Total Earnings ($) -569 -655 271 635 935 
(827) (872) (706) (937) (675) 
Other post-claim outcomes 
Number of post-claim employers -0.07 0.07 -0.32 -0.19 -0.15 
(0.30) (0.34) (0.25) (0.42) (0.24) 
Quarters of nonemployment 0.11 1.04 0.36 0.32 -0.69 
(0.89) (0.78) (0.39) (0.61) (0.58) 
Std. deviation earnings ($) -217 -135 -13 -644* 53 
(333) (320) (268) (353) (254) 
Quarters with first post-claim employer -0.09 -1.51* 1.33 0.58 0.99 
(0.74) (0.87) (0.87) (1.00) (0.79) 
Returned to same employer (proportion) 0.021 -0.013 0.056 0.050 0.062** 
(0.033) (0.030) (0.036) (0.045) (0.032) 
Returned to same industry (proportion) 0.017 -0.013 0.058* 0.081* 0.035 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.035) (0.048) (0.032) 
Sample size 550 511 780 486 818 







Mean and Standard Deviation (in parentheses) of Outcomes of the Control Group by Reason for Job Loss 










UI Receipt Outcomes 
Benefit year outcomes 
Total UI benefits paid ($) 1,794 2,376 1,767 2,283 1,846
 (1,734)  (1,822)  (1,592)  (1,853)  (1,649) 
Weeks of UI payments 13.4 16.9 12.6 15.3 13.5
 (10.8)  (10.7)  (9.7)  (10.)  (10.4) 
Exhausted benefits (proportion) 0.253 0.313 0.149 0.226 0.224
 (0.435)  (0.465)  (0.357)  (0.419)  (0.417) 
Employment Outcomes 
Year 0 outcomes 
Employed (proportion) 0.834 0.868 0.941 0.925 0.867
 (0.373)  (0.339)  (0.236)  (0.264)  (0.339) 
Hours worked 889 923 1,211 969 1,008
 (826)  (743)  (706)  (685)  (749) 
Total Earnings ($) 8,180 9,846 15,223 13,571 11,043
 (8,783)  (9,779)  (11,568)  (10,993)  (9,192) 
Year 1 outcomes 
Employed (proportion) 0.796 0.845 0.882 0.874 0.834
 (0.404)  (0.362)  (0.323)  (0.332)  (0.373) 
Hours worked 979 1,120 1,309 1,115 1,118
 (835)  (793)  (834)  (752)  (842) 
Total Earnings ($) 10,032 11,924 16,215 15,567 12,480
 (9,757)  (10,566)  (12,654)  (11,881)  (10,329) 
Other post-claim outcomes 
Number of post-claim employers 4.63 4.63 4.50 5.93 4.36
 (3.57)  (3.6)  (3.53)  (4.46)  (3.74) 
Quarters of nonemployment 5.07 4.19 2.05 2.78 4.07
 (10.24)  (9.09)  (4.69)  (6.75)  (9.12) 
Std. deviation earnings ($) 5,217 5,985 6,228 7,067 5,794
 (3,920)  (4,451)  (3,861)  (4,278)  (3,849) 
Quarters with first post-claim employer 5.84 7.06 9.30 7.77 8.24
 (9.09)  (10.24)  (11.62)  (10.16)  (10.89) 
Returned to same employer (proportion) 0.136 0.125 0.51 0.347 0.369
 (0.343)  (0.331)  (0.501)  (0.477)  (0.483) 
Returned to same industry (proportion) 0.26 0.242 0.606 0.456 0.487
 (0.44)  (0.429)  (0.489)  (0.499)  (0.5) 
Sample size 550 511 780 486 818 
Notes:  Universe consists of the control group during fall 1986, winter 1987, and spring 1987.
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Effects of Exception Reporting as Deviations from the Control Group on Long-Term Employment, Hours, and Earnings for Claimants
with a Higher than Average Predicted Likelihood of Benefit Exhaustion 
Outcome Proportion employed Hours worked Total Earnings ($) 
Comparison Exception Exception 
Comparison group Exception Reporting group Reporting Comparison group Reporting 
(Std. (Std. (Std.Mean (Std.dev.) Coeff. Mean (Std.dev.) Coeff. Mean (Std.dev.) Coeff. 
error) error) error) 
Year relative to claim 
Year 0 0.828  (0.378) -0.038 (0.023) 784.9  (754) -25.9 (43.1) 8723  (8684) -344 (509) 
Year 1 0.788  (0.409) -0.008 (0.024) 958  (830) 12.7 (49.0) 10636  (10077) 369 (619) 
Year 2 0.758  (0.429) -0.019 (0.025) 945.2  (837) 16.2 (49.6) 11432  (11487) -355 (671) 
Year 3 0.722  (0.449) -0.046* (0.027) 914.1  (876) 46.8 (52.0) 11110  (12146) -23 (704) 
Year 4 0.68  (0.467) -0.030 (0.028) 855.6  (875) 49.5 (52.2) 10524  (11958) 133 (709) 
Year 5 0.642  (0.48) -0.028 (0.028) 825.5  (894) 36.1 (52.7) 10058  (11560) 531 (702) 
Year 6 0.599  (0.491) -0.004 (0.029) 763.5  (898) 51 (52.6) 8903  (11460) 1,032 (688) 
Year 7 0.577  (0.495) -0.004 (0.029) 759.7  (904) 32.8 (53.1) 8706  (11176) 857 (682) 
Year 8 0.537  (0.499) 0.013 (0.029) 701.5  (878) 38 (52.2) 8421  (11168) 929 (694) 
Year 9 0.537  (0.499) 0.006 (0.029) 766.2  (929) -13.2 (54.4) 8853  (11680) 820 (736) 
Sample size 1,166 1,166 1,166 
Notes:  See annotations to Table A2. 

The control group consists of claimants in the control and new work search groups with a higher than average probability of exhausting benefits. The
 
average probability of exhausting benefits equals 0.264.
 
Table A8 
Effecst of Exception Reporting as Deviations from the Control Group on Long-Term Employment, Hours, and Earnings for Claimants
with a Lower than Average Predicted Likelihood of Benefit Exhaustion 
Outcome Proportion employed Hours worked Total Earnings ($) 
Comparison Exception Exception 
Comparison group Exception Reporting group Reporting Comparison group Reporting 
Mean (Std.dev.) Coeff. (Std.
error) 
Coeff. Mean (Std.dev.) (Std.
error) 
Mean (Std.dev.) Coeff. (Std.
error) 
Year relative to claim 
Year 0 0.921  (0.27) -0.006 (0.012) 1142  (718) -34.8 (32.6) 13371  (10902) -636 (478) 
Year 1 0.879  (0.326) -0.013 (0.015) 1239  (802) -17.5 (36.8) 14800  (11695) -149 (530) 
Year 2 0.851  (0.356) -0.017 (0.016) 1249  (851) -43.9 (38.3) 15681  (12430) -692 (553) 
Year 3 0.814  (0.389) -0.005 (0.018) 1204  (868) -5.7 (38.9) 15275  (12319) -422 (556) 
Year 4 0.787  (0.41) -0.013 (0.019) 1149  (879) -29.2 (39.0) 15173  (13230) -712 (578) 
Year 5 0.776  (0.417) -0.02 (0.019) 1101  (877) 8 (39.8) 14639  (13217) -225 (583) 
Year 6 0.734  (0.442) 0.001 (0.020) 1059  (916) -8 (40.9) 14055  (13428) -463 (584) 
Year 7 0.718  (0.45) -0.01 (0.020) 1073  (919) -47.9 (41.1) 13964  (13474) -477 (600) 
Year 8 0.703  (0.457) -0.027 (0.021) 1018  (917) -34.8 (41.5) 13695  (13754) -426 (621) 
Year 9 0.682  (0.466) -0.018 (0.021) 1010  (940) -9.7 (42.1) 13944  (14572) -532 (642) 
Sample size 1,979 1,979 1,979 
Notes: Same as above.
 
The control group consists of claimants in the control and new work search groups with a lower than average probability of exhausting benefits. The
 









Effects of Exception Reporting as Deviations from the Control Group on Long-Term Employment Outcomes by Varying
Likelihood of Exhausting Benefits 
Probability of exhausting benefits Probability of exhausting benefits
Sample 
higher than averagea lower than averageb 
Exception Exception
Control group Reporting Control group Reporting 
Mean (Std. dev.) Coeff. (Std.
error) 
Mean (Std. dev.) Coeff. (Std.
error) 
Outcome 
Number of post-claim employers 4.81  ( 4.03) -0.44* (0.23) 4.69  (3.66) -0.1 (0.17) 
Quarters of nonemployment 5.20  (10.45) 0.01 (0.59) 2.70  (6.52) 0.24 (0.30) 
Std. deviation of post-claim earnings ($) 5,676  (4,317) -254 (243) 6,221  (3,920) -188 (175) 
Quarters with first post-claim employer 6.32  (9.3) 0.25 (0.55) 8.62  (11.19) 0.43 (0.51) 
Returned to same employer (proportion) 0.204  (0.404) 0.012 (0.024) 0.378  (0.485) 0.043* (0.022) 
Returned to same industry (proportion) 0.298  (0.458) 0.02 (0.027) 0.501  (0.5) 0.028 (0.022) 
Sample size 1,166 1,979 
Notes:  See annotations to Table A2.
a. The comparison group consist of claimants in the control group with a higher than average probability of exhausting benefits. The average 
probability of exhausting benefits equals 0.264. 
b.The comparison group consist of claimants in the control group with a lower than average probability of exhausting benefits. The average 





Estimated probability of exhausting benefits (probit






































Earnings 1 year before claim 
Earnings 2 years before claim 








Hours 1 year before claim 
Hours 2 years before claim 
















Reason for job loss
permanent layoff 
temporary layoff with recall date 
contract/seasonal 
Employer-attached/placed by union 
Prior UI claim 
duration ≤ 15 weeks 
duration > 15 weeks 
UI benefits/claim type 
weekly amount ($) 
maximum amount ($) 
potential duration 
replacement rate (percent) 
combined wage claim 
ex-service member claim 






























































married female 0.177** 
(0.085) 
Household status 
1 dependent -0.033 
(0.064) 




unemployment rate in the area -0.143** 
(0.062) 
Quarter of claim 
Summer 1986 0.333*** 
(0.076) 
Fall 1986 0.173** 
(0.087) 
Winter 1987 0.192 
(0.152) 




Sample size 4,811 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** 


















    
  





This appendix describes the original data from the Washington Alternative Work Search 
(WAWS) experiment (Johnson and Klepinger 1991, 1994) and how we constructed the long­
term panel used to examine the long-term effects of the WAWS treatments on labor market
outcomes (sections 1 and 2). We also provide a discussion of the extent and severity of attrition 
from the long-term sample (section 3).
1. Description of the Experimental Data
The data we use to replicate and extend the short-term findings of the Washington experiment
were provided to the W.E. Upjohn Institute by the Washington State Employment Security
Department (ESD) in June 1989. According to ESD, they are the same data provided to Terry
Johnson and Daniel Klepinger, who performed the evaluation at Battelle Memorial Institute for
the U.S. Department of Labor (Johnson and Klepinger 1991, 1994); however, they do not include
responses to the survey referred to by Johnson and Klepinger (1991). We refer to these as “the
experimental data.” 
The experimental data combine data from three sources:
• UI claims records — the records maintained by the ESD to track each worker’s benefit
eligibility and the timing and amount of benefits paid in each week of the benefit year
• Administrative wage records — the quarterly records provided by each covered employer
in the state to the ESD to determine the employer’s UI payroll tax liability and to track
the wages and hours of each employee (which in turn are used to determine UI eligibility
and the weekly benefit amount)
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Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment Data Appendix
• Employment Service records — the records maintained by the state Employment Service
on each job seeker, which include a range of personal characteristics of claimants that are
inessential to running the UI system but useful in referring and placing workers in jobs
For example, data on UI benefits, including weeks of benefits paid and whether a worker
exhausted benefits, are from UI claims records; quarterly earnings, hours, and data on industry of
employment and whether a worker returned to the pre-UI employer are from administrative wage
records; and individual characteristics (including occupation) and whether a worker was on 
standby are from the Employment Service records.
Details of the assignment protocol
The experimental data do not include an explicit treatment indicator, so we created one 
using the last digit of each claimant’s pseudo-Social Security number and the date of his or her
enrollment in the experiment. (The last number of the pseudo-SSN was not altered from the last
number of the true SSN.) Initially, the Tacoma UI office assigned claimants with SSN ending in
0, 1, or 2 to the Exception Reporting group; 3, 4, or 5 to the control group; 6 or 7 to the New
Work Search (NWS) policy group; and 8 or 9 to the Job Search Assistance (JSA) group (Johnson 
and Klepinger refer to this as the Intensive Services group). However, starting with the week of
May 10, 1987, ESD stopped enrolling claimants in the Exception Reporting (ER) treatment 
because it was clear that claimants assigned to this group were claiming more benefits and 
experiencing longer spells of insured unemployment than the control group. Thereafter, the
Tacoma office assigned claimants with SSN ending in 0, 1, or 2 to JSA. Accordingly, we
assigned claimants with SSN = 0, 1, or 2 and benefit year starting in week 27 of 1986 through 
week 18 of 1987 (inclusive) to the ER group, and claimants with SSN = 0, 1, or 2 and benefit
Lachowska, Meral, and Woodbury
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Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment Data Appendix
year starting in week 19 of 1987 through week 35 of 1987 (inclusive) to the JSA treatment group 
(as well as all claimants with SSN = 8 or 9).
Because the assignment procedure changed in May 1987, the number of claimants in 
each of the treatment groups does not reflect the 30-30-20-20 proportions that would be
suggested by the original assignment protocol. Rather, 30 percent of all assigned claimants are 
controls, 23 percent (rather than 30 percent) are in the ER treatment, 21 percent are in the New
Work Search Policy treatment, and 27 percent (rather than 20 percent) are in the JSA treatment.1
Replicating Johnson and Klepinger’s sample
Claimants who failed the separation requirement for UI need to be dropped from the
sample, but the experimental data do not include a binary indicator of whether the claimant
satisfied that requirement. The data do include two “separation issue” variables, one for the total
number of separation issues raised during the benefit year, the other a set of weekly variables
indicating whether a separation issue was raised in that week. The two are inconsistent, and our
solution was to drop all workers with at least one separation issue during the benefit year and 
zero benefits paid, on the assumption that they were ineligible due to a separation issue. 
For our project studying the long-term effects of assignment to intensive services (JSA), 
we also dropped four claimants who were assigned to the control group but who received 
intensive services. Presumably, these claimants happened to be at the Tacoma Employment
Service Center when an intensive services workshop was conducted and were either directed to
attend (mistakenly) or attended voluntarily. This “cross-over” of four claimants from the control
group to the JSA treatment group represents an assignment error rate of about 0.15 percent
(2,597 controls received at least one week of benefits and did not attend the intensive services
1. These proportions are with respect to the full sample of 9,607, which is the number of benefit years in the
experimental data before dropping any claimants who never received a benefit check.
Lachowska, Meral, and Woodbury
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Experimental Claim Quarter, 
cohort Q(t) Q(t+1)  Q(t+2) Q(t+3)   Q(t+42) 
1  1986: Q3  N/ A 1987: Q1 1987: Q2 …  1997: Q1 
2 1986:Q4  1987:Q1 1987:Q2 1987:Q3  … 1997:Q2 
3 1987:Q1  1987:Q2 1987:Q3 1987:Q4  … 1997:Q3 








Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment Data Appendix
workshop). We do not drop these claimants from the study of the effects of ER on long-term 
outcomes. 
The sample we use to study the effects of ER on long-term outcomes is smaller than the
sample used by Johnson and Klepinger (1991, 1994). This is for two reasons. First, note that the
ER treatment consisted of four experimental cohorts, with the first cohort assigned in week 27 of
1986:III and the last cohort assigned in week 18 of 1987:II. In order to make sure that we 
observe the ER, control, and new work search policy group over the same time period, we only
keep claimants who claimed between week 27 of 1986 (inclusive) and week 18 of 1987 
(inclusive). Second, because the follow-up administrative wage records available to us begin in 
1987:I, for the first experimental cohort we do not have follow-up records for the first post-claim 
quarter (denoted Q(t+1)), 1986:IV; see the table below.
Structure of the long-term panel 
Because we are missing administrative records for the first post-claim quarter for experimental
cohort 1 (see the table), we exclude all the claimants from this cohort. Hence, our final analysis
sample consists of claimants assigned to ER, control, and NWS group during who claimed 
between 1986:IV (specifically, claimants who claimed beginning with week 40 of 1986) and 
1987:II (specifically, claimants who claimed in week 18 of 1987). 
Lachowska, Meral, and Woodbury
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Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment Data Appendix
Because the administrative wage records all end in 1997:IV and the last quarter the ER
treatment was conducted in 1987:II, we have at least 42 quarters of post-claim quarter
observations; see the table above. In order to have nine complete years of follow-up 
administrative wage records for all claimants in the analysis sample, we decided to study long­
term outcomes for 40 quarters after the claim quarter.
Although the sample we use is not identical to that used by Johnson and Klepinger (1991, 
1994), both our short-term treatment effects and theirs are essentially similar, as can be seen by
comparing Tables 2 and 3 in our ER paper with Tables 1, 2, and 3 in Johnson and Klepinger
(1994).
Claimants with two benefit years
Each observation in the experimental data represents a UI claimant’s “benefit year”—that 
is, the year following the initial UI claim, during which the claimant could receive UI benefits.
For 9,207 initial UI claimants, one observation (that is, one benefit year) appears in the
experimental data; however, for 200 claimants, two observations appear. These latter claimants
each started a benefit year in the early months of the WAWS experiment (in July or August
1986). This benefit year lapsed a year later, and these 200 claimants established a new benefit
year in July or August 1997, while the Washington experiment was still in progress. As a result, 
they were again assigned to a treatment or to the control group and are included in our sample.
Benefit duration
Another key variable we constructed is the duration of the first UI claim spell. The
experimental data include a variable for the amount of UI benefit paid in each of the 52 weeks of
the benefit year, so we followed each claimant’s benefit payments from the time of the initial 
claim until the series lapsed for at least four weeks. This follows the procedure used by
Lachowska, Meral, and Woodbury
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Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment Data Appendix
Spiegelman, O’Leary and Kline (1992, 1995) and Corson, Decker, Dunstan, and Kerachsky
(1992) in a similar setting, although appears to differ from Johnson and Klepinger (1991, 1994), 
who ended the first spell with a lapse of one week. Inspection of the data shows that many
claimants with a lapse of three or fewer weeks had a subsequent claim series of at least another
four weeks, which suggested a single spell of insured unemployment briefly interrupted by time
out of the labor force, rather than reemployment. We have checked the sensitivity of the findings
and hazards we report to different definitions of a first spell (a one-week lapse, two-weeks, and 
so on) and obtain similar findings in each case.
We counted claimants who were eligible for benefits, but who never received a payment, 
as having a one-week UI claim spell (corresponding to the waiting week). There are 726 such 
claimants. Another 1,830 claimants did not receive benefits within two weeks of their initial 
claim, but did receive benefits later in the benefit year. For these, we started the first UI spell in
the week before the first payment (to account for the waiting week) and again followed the
benefit payments until the series lapsed for at least four weeks.
For 7,051 claimants (73.4 percent of those in the experiment), the first spell of UI
accounts for all benefits paid in the benefit year. The rest received additional benefits later in the 
benefit year. We refer to the total number of weeks in which a claimant received benefits as the 
“compressed UI spell.” Although useful as a measure of the total effect of a treatment, a 
compressed spell does not correspond to a true duration because it combines spells of benefit
receipt separated by at least four weeks. Accordingly, the hazard functions we display (and our
interpretation of the treatment effects on search behavior) focus on the duration of the first claim
spell.
Reason for job loss
Lachowska, Meral, and Woodbury
61





   
 
   
 
       
    
 
   
  








   
  
Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment Data Appendix
Reason for job loss is another key claim characteristic. To construct this variable we 
create five mutually exclusive categories by using “unemployed due to lack of work” and
“reason for lack of work” indicators from the Employment Service records. We define
“unemployed due to permanent job loss” if a claimant was either laid off permanently because of
a plant or company closure; “unemployed due to temporary layoff” if a claimant was laid off
temporarily either with a known recall date or without a recall date; “unemployed due to contract 
completion or seasonal layoff” if a claimant was laid off because of job or contract completion or
because of a seasonal layoff; “unemployment not due to job loss,” which we call “quit” for short, 
if the reason for lack of work was missing and the claimant was unemployed not due to lack of
work. Note that, typically, if a worker voluntarily quit his or her job, he or she is not eligible for
UI benefits. Such a worker might still receive benefits, if the reason for the quit meets the 
“standard for good cause,” such as showing that the claimants left due to a hostile work 
environment (e.g., because of discrimination or sexual harassment). Finally, we define “reason
for unemployment unknown” if there is no information regarding if the claimant was
unemployed due to lack of work or if the reason for lack of work is missing. This last group is
the largest of the groups. 
2. Constructing a Long-Term Panel
To construct a long-term panel, we appended additional administrative wage records to the
experimental data described above. In Washington, wage records include the following for each 
worker in each quarter:
• a worker identifier (pseudo-Social Security number)
• the year and quarter
Lachowska, Meral, and Woodbury
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Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment Data Appendix
• the pseudo-employer account number and earnings received from that employer in that
quarter (for each employer from whom the worker received earnings), and
• hours worked in the quarter (again, for each employer)
Coverage of the UI system is nearly universal (self-employed workers are the only significant
group of “above-ground” workers who are not covered), and any UI-covered worker who has
earnings in a given quarter from an employer in the state appears in the wage records. As a 
result, wage records can be used to construct an earnings history of most workers who were in 
the WAWS experiment. For this study, we had available the population of Washington 
administrative wage records for quarters 1987:I through 1997:IV inclusive, so we can observe up 
to nine years of earnings following the Washington experiment by matching workers in the
experiment with their wage records.
How reliable are earnings histories constructed from wage records likely to be? Because 
wage records are central to financing and administering UI, most states randomly audit employer
wage reports. Analyses of these audits by Blakemore et al. (1996) and Burgess, Blakemore, and 
Low (1998) suggest that small employers and employers with high turnover tend to underreport
their workers’ earnings, raising questions about the value of wage records for research. However, 
validation studies comparing wage records (whose source is the employer) with survey data
(whose source is the worker) suggest that the reliability of wage records is similar to that of
surveys. Kornfeld and Bloom (1999) performed a landmark study comparing UI wage records
with survey data in a 12-state sample of over 12,000 low-wage workers who participated in the 
National JTPA Study. They concluded that, except for young males with past arrests, “UI wage
records provide a valid alternative to surveys” for the purpose of evaluating employment and 
earnings outcomes of training programs (Kornfeld and Bloom 1999, p. 171). Wallace and
Lachowska, Meral, and Woodbury
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Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment Data Appendix
Haveman’s (2007) validation study focused on welfare recipients in Wisconsin and found that, 
despite discrepancies, wage records and survey data gave similar results on employment and
earnings outcomes. Wallace and Haveman conclude that, given their availability, low cost, and
similarity across states, UI wage records are preferable to surveys for monitoring labor market
outcomes of low-wage workers.
Table 1 shows the results of matching workers enrolled in the Washington experiment
with the Washington wage records. The table shows the number of matches for the all claimants
in the experiment (the “Total” column) and each treatment group (including controls) by year.2
A “match” occurs when a claimant is observed with earnings in the Washington administrative
wage records in a given year. The table also shows “match rates” (in parentheses) defined as the 
proportion of claimants initially enrolled in the experiment (or each treatment) observed with 
positive earnings (or “matched”) in a given year. In the table, “year 0” refers to the claim year,
defined as the quarter in which the initial UI claim was filed and the three following quarters.3
The Washington experiment enrolled new claimants between July 1986 and August 1987, 
so it should be possible to match most of the enrolled claimants with their 1987 wage records. 
(Claimants would not have a 1987 match if they claimed benefits in 1986 or early 1987 and 
never found reemployment, withdrew from the labor force, or for a few other reasons — see the 
following section.) As Table 1 shows, 86.5 percent of claimants enrolled in the experiment could 
be matched with wage records at some time during the claim year. This match rate falls unevenly
to 62.5 percent in year 9, or at an average of just under 3 percentage points per year. Specifically, 
2. The “Total” column gives the sum of the full control, Exception Reporting, New Work Search, and JSA groups.
The full control group is used with the Exception Reporting and New Work Search treatments. The restricted control
group, which drops claimants who never received a benefit, is used with the JSA treatment because only JSA
assignees who received a first benefit payment received a JSA call-in notice.
3. This is the definition we use in all long-term analyses. It differs from the definition we use in the short-term
analyses, where “claim year” refers to the quarter in which the initial UI claim was filed and the four following
quarters.
Lachowska, Meral, and Woodbury
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Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment Data Appendix
the match rate falls by about 4 percentage points between years 0 and 1, then by 3 percentage
points per year until year 5, after which it falls somewhat more slowly.
3. Attrition from the Long-term Sample
The match rates shown in Table 1 decline over time for two reasons. First, workers may remain 
unemployed or drop out of the labor force after claiming UI, so they will have no earnings and 
none will appear in the wage records. Second, workers could become self-employed, leave the
formal labor force for the underground economy, or leave Washington State and find 
employment elsewhere.4 In these latter cases, a worker will have earnings, but those earnings
will not be recorded in the UI wage records of Washington State. (Self-employed workers are not
covered by UI, earnings in the underground economy are not reported, and out-of-state earnings
will be picked up in the wage records of another state.)
In the first case (continued unemployment or departure from the labor force) wage 
records give a correct picture of the individual’s labor market status. In the second (movement to 
self-employment, the underground economy, or out of Washington), we have a form of sample
attrition. There is no way of distinguishing between the two cases — if an individual has covered 
earnings in Washington, they appear (or should) in administrative wage records; otherwise, we
observe a missing value for the individual in a given quarter. (In wage records, there is no 
difference between zero earnings and missing earnings.)
Attrition of participants from a long-term panel poses a threat to the validity of an
experimental study if the subjects who leave the sample differ systematically and in unobserved
ways from those who remain (see for example, the discussion and references in Murnane and 
4. The WAWS experimental design attempted to lessen the problem of losing workers who move to another state by
excluding interstate claims; however, this by no means eliminates the possibility.
Lachowska, Meral, and Woodbury
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Willett 2011). Sample attrition is usually considered as a problem of nonresponse: experiments
conducted with household surveys depend on both a survey center’s ability to find participants
and on participants’ cooperation over a long period of time (Hausman and Wise 1979, McFadden 
1985). Administrative data have an advantage over survey data because they are potentially less
vulnerable to attrition: anyone who receives covered earnings in given state in a given quarter
should be observed in UI administrative wage records, regardless of whether that individual can 
be found or is willing to cooperate.5
Nevertheless, earnings histories constructed from UI administrative data could be subject
to attrition that would bias experimental estimators. In the case of the WAWS experiment, if a
treatment increased the long-term probability of becoming self-employed, moving to the
underground economy, or taking a job in another state, then sample attrition from the treatment
group would be greater than from the control group, the earnings of those assigned to the
treatment would be understated in Washington State administrative wage records, and the
estimated treatment effects estimator would be downward-biased. 
To investigate the extent to which sample attrition could be a threat to the validity of the
estimators, we perform a difference-in-differences analysis of the characteristics of successive 
groups of claimants who are observed with earnings. We first calculate the claim year (year 0)
differences in average characteristics between a given treatment group (with earnings) and the 
control group (also with earnings), then do the same for each subsequent year. We then calculate
the differences in these differences between the claim year and each subsequent year (along with
the standard error of each difference in differences).
5. Also, with survey data, attrition is typically an absorbing state — once a subject leaves the sample, he or she does
not return. This is not the case with administrative data, where a subject may have no earnings for one or several
quarters but then return to work and appear again in the administrative records.
Lachowska, Meral, and Woodbury
66
    
     
      
   








    
   
 
  
   
  
   




Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment Data Appendix
Specifically, for a given characteristic x, the difference in differences (or change in the
differences) between the treatment group (T) and the control group (C), between year t (a 
subsequent year) and year 0 (the claim year), can be written:
(xt ,T − xt ,C ) − (x0,T − x0,C ) (1)
If the differences in differences are insubstantial for most characteristics, then we would infer
that the observable characteristics of claimants who are leaving the treatment and control
samples over time (that is, no longer observed with earnings) are similar. It does not necessarily
follow that the unobservable characteristics of claimants leaving the two groups over time are 
also similar; however, given that we find the selection on observables assumption to be
reasonable based on pre-treatment outcome tests, it seems plausible that unobservables and 
observables are correlated in these samples. If so, then finding that the observable characteristics
of claimants who leave the treatment and controls groups over time are similar would suggest
that selective attrition is not a threat to the validity of the estimators we use.
Tables 2, 3, and 4 display the findings of such a difference-in-differences analysis.
Consider first Table 2, which pertains to attrition from the JSA treatment. Columns 1 and 2 show
sample means for the control and JSA groups in the claim year (year 0), and column 3 shows the
difference for each characteristic in the claim year. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the difference (or
change) between this claim-year difference and the difference in years 3, 6, and 9. (We have also 
computed differences in differences for years 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8, but for the sake of economy we
do not report them. As discussed below, and their implications are the same as those for the years
shown.)
For example, the claim-year difference in the proportion of the control and JSA groups
who were male was about 2 percentage points (0.0192, p-value = 0.17) (see column 1, Table 2). 
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Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment Data Appendix
By year 3, this difference had increased by 0.0001 (that is, to 0.0193, p-value = 1.00), by year 6 
it had increased by 0.0023 (p-value = 0.91), and by year 9 it had fallen by 0.0037 (p-value = 
0.86). None of these differences in differences is significant, statistically or in practical terms
(the absolute values of the standard errors of these differences in differences are at least 5 times
the point estimates).
For all but five variables shown in Table 2, the claim-year difference between the control
and JSA groups had a p-value greater than 0.10; that is, for all but five characteristics, there was
no initial difference between the control and JSA groups. Further, in all these cases, there was no 
subsequent change over time in the difference between the control and JSA groups — that is, the
differences in differences over the following 9 years all have p-values greater than 0.10.
For five variables, the claim-year difference between the control and JSA groups has a p-
value of 0.10 or less: claimants from households with 1 dependent, who formerly worked in 
wholesale trade, who formerly worked in government, who were ex-service members, and whose 
reservation wage was between $10 and $20. For each of these characteristics, the initial
difference between the control and JSA groups persists throughout the 9-year follow-up period 
— the estimated differences in differences all have p-values greater than 0.10. 
Overall, the inference is that, if there was no initial difference between the control and
JSA groups in a given characteristic, none appeared over time. And if there was initially a 
difference in a characteristic between the control and JSA groups, that difference did not change
over time. Assignment to treatment appears to have had no impact on the characteristics of the 
JSA claimants compared with those of the controls. 
Consider now Table 3 (comparing controls with Exception Reporting claimants) and 
Table 4 (comparing controls with New Work Search claimants). Columns 3, 4, and 5 of those
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tables show only two differences in differences with a p-value of 0.10 or less: for both the
Exception Reporting and New Work Search groups, the year 9 differences in differences for the
proportion of females aged 45–54 have p-values between 0.08 and 0.09. That is, by year 9, the
difference between the control and Exception Reporting groups in the proportion of females aged 
45–54 had increased by 1.4 percentage point (p-value = 0.09); a similar finding holds for women 
aged 45–54 in the control and New Work Search groups (an increase of 1.6 percentage points by
year 9, p-value = 0.08). 
As mentioned above, in addition to the differences in differences for years 3, 6, and 9 
shown in Tables 2, 3, and 4, we have computed corresponding differences in differences for
years 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8. None of these estimates has a p-value of 0.10 or less. 
We conclude that the observable characteristics of claimants who left the control group 
over time and those who left each of the treatment groups over time are essentially the same.
Again, although this does not dispose of the possibility that those who left the treatment and 
control groups differed in unobservable ways, our finding that selection on observables is a
reasonable assumption suggests that sample attrition probably does not threaten the validity of
the estimators we use. Given that we are unable to detect any changes over time in the 
observable characteristics of controls compared with each of the treatment groups, it seems 
unlikely that sample attrition of any consequence is taking place. 
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Matches1 and match rates2 (in parentheses) between population wage records and claimants
enrolled in the Washington Alternative Work Search experiment, by year and treatment group 
Restricted
Full control Exception New Work control 
Total3 group4  Reporting  Search group4 JSA 
Year 0 8,092 2,447 1,906 1,728 2,227 2,011 
(0.865) (0.859) (0.848) (0.880) (0.858) (0.878) 
Year 1 7,720 2,350 1,849 1,621 2,145 1,900 
(0.826) (0.825) (0.823) (0.826) (0.826) (0.829) 
Year 2 7,438 2,266 1,769 1,552 2,062 1,851 
(0.796) (0.796) (0.787) (0.791) (0.794) (0.808) 
Year 3 7,183 2,195 1,692 1,498 1,999 1,798 
(0.768) (0.771) (0.753) (0.763) (0.770) (0.785) 
Year 4 6,888 2,123 1,625 1,417 1,927 1,723 
(0.737) (0.745) (0.723) (0.722) (0.742) (0.752) 
Year 5 6,590 2,028 1,570 1,353 1,835 1,639 
(0.705) (0.712) (0.698) (0.689) (0.707) (0.715) 
Year 6 6,357 1,930 1,522 1,320 1,749 1,585 
(0.680) (0.678) (0.677) (0.672) (0.673) (0.692) 
Year 7 6,146 1,873 1,458 1,270 1,701 1,545 
(0.657) (0.658) (0.649) (0.647) (0.655) (0.674) 
Year 8 5,942 1,825 1,413 1,219 1,658 1,485 
(0.636) (0.641) (0.629) (0.621) (0.638) (0.648) 
Year 9 5,848 1,785 1,388 1,201 1,629 1,474 
(0.625) (0.627) (0.617) (0.612) (0.627) (0.643) 
Number
enrolled 9,350 2,848 2,248 1,963 2,597 2,291 
Source: Tabulated from the Washington Alternative Work Search experimental data base and population wage records
from the Washington State Department of Employment Security.
1. A "match" occurs for a claimant in a given year if positive earnings were found in at least one quarter of the year for
the claimant. 
2. The match rate is the proportion of claimants initially enrolled in the experiment (or in a treatment) who were
observed with earnings in a given year.
3. Sum of the full control, Exception Reporting, New Work Search, and JSA groups.
4. The full control group is used with the Exception Reporting and New Work Search treatments. The restricted control
group, which drops claimants who never received a benefit, is used with the JSA treatment because only JSA assignees













Characteristics of controls and JSA claimants with earnings in claim year, and differences in differences
between controls and JSA claimants (subsequent years against claim year) 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Difference in differences between control
Claim year 
Difference 















Male 0.6974 0.7166 0.0192 0.0001 0.0023 -0.0037 
(0.0097) (0.0101) (0.0140) (0.0203) (0.0211) (0.0216) 
Age (years) 
≤ 24 0.2021 0.1949 -0.0071 0.0015 -0.0011 0.0071 
(0.0085) (0.0088) (0.0123) (0.0179) (0.0187) (0.0192) 
25-34 0.3767 0.3894 0.0126 -0.0057 -0.0121 -0.0263 
(0.0103) (0.0109) (0.0150) (0.0218) (0.0226) (0.0231) 
35-44 0.2506 0.2496 -0.0009 0.0100 0.0150 0.0207 
(0.0092) (0.0097) (0.0133) (0.0195) (0.0202) (0.0208) 
45-54 0.1159 0.1094 -0.0065 -0.0040 0.0050 0.0062 
(0.0068) (0.0070) (0.0097) (0.0142) (0.0145) (0.0143) 
≥ 54 0.0548 0.0567 0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0068 -0.0078 
(0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0071) (0.0098) (0.0088) (0.0086) 
Gender-age interactions 
male ≤ 24 0.1352 0.1348 -0.0004 0.0044 0.0008 0.0042 
(0.0072) (0.0076) (0.0105) (0.0154) (0.0161) (0.0165) 
male 25-34 0.2762 0.2904 0.0142 -0.0064 -0.0095 -0.0216 
(0.0095) (0.0101) (0.0139) (0.0202) (0.0211) (0.0215) 
male 35-44 0.1652 0.1735 0.0083 0.0039 0.0112 0.0146 
(0.0079) (0.0084) (0.0115) (0.0168) (0.0175) (0.0180) 
male 45-54 0.0790 0.0771 -0.0020 -0.0053 0.0002 0.0008 
(0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0083) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0121) 
male ≥ 54 0.0418 0.0408 -0.0010 0.0034 -0.0004 -0.0017 
(0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0061) (0.0084) (0.0075) (0.0073) 
female ≤ 24 0.0669 0.0602 -0.0067 -0.0029 -0.0019 0.0030 
(0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0075) (0.0109) (0.0113) (0.0116) 
female 25-34 0.1006 0.0990 -0.0016 0.0007 -0.0026 -0.0046 
(0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0092) (0.0133) (0.0140) (0.0144) 
female 35-44 0.0853 0.0761 -0.0092 0.0061 0.0038 0.0061 
(0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0084) (0.0123) (0.0128) (0.0133) 
female 45-54 0.0368 0.0323 -0.0045 0.0013 0.0048 0.0054 
(0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0056) (0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0082) 
female ≥ 54 0.0130 0.0159 0.0029 -0.0053 -0.0064 -0.0061 
(0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0037) (0.0051) (0.0047) (0.0047) 
Ethnicity 
white 0.8244 0.8424 0.0179 -0.0105 -0.0036 0.0026 
(0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0114) (0.0165) (0.0171) (0.0173) 
black 0.0997 0.0880 -0.0117 0.0065 0.0020 0.0065 
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0090) (0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0134) 







Difference in differences between control
Claim year and JSA groups (year t  – claim year) 
Difference 
(treatment
Control mean JSA mean – control) Year 3 Year 6 Year 9 
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0080) (0.0116) (0.0121) (0.0122) 
Schooling (years) 
less than high school 0.1383 0.1273 -0.0110 0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0043 
(0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0104) (0.0151) (0.0154) (0.0156) 
high school 0.5384 0.5525 0.0141 -0.0004 0.0039 -0.0080 
(0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0153) (0.0223) (0.0231) (0.0235) 
some college 0.2434 0.2387 -0.0047 0.0018 -0.0011 0.0117 
(0.0091) (0.0095) (0.0132) (0.0191) (0.0199) (0.0203) 
college graduate 0.0799 0.0816 0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0012 0.0006 
(0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0084) (0.0123) (0.0128) (0.0131) 
Marital status/gender 
married male 0.2690 0.2636 -0.0054 -0.0084 -0.0138 -0.0121 
(0.0094) (0.0098) (0.0136) (0.0198) (0.0203) (0.0208) 
married female 0.0961 0.0865 -0.0096 0.0072 0.0107 0.0113 
(0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0089) (0.0129) (0.0133) (0.0135) 
Household status 
no dependents 0.3044 0.3068 0.0024 0.0045 0.0078 0.0170 
(0.0098) (0.0103) (0.0142) (0.0206) (0.0212) (0.0216) 
1 dependent 0.1504 0.1318 -0.0187 -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0055 
(0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0107) (0.0156) (0.0161) (0.0166) 
2 or more dependents 0.2393 0.2392 -0.0002 -0.0028 0.0025 -0.0098 
(0.0090) (0.0095) (0.0131) (0.0191) (0.0199) (0.0203) 
homeowner 0.2928 0.2740 -0.0188 0.0010 0.0019 0.0060 
(0.0096) (0.0099) (0.0139) (0.0201) (0.0208) (0.0212) 
Veteran 0.2411 0.2307 -0.0104 -0.0075 -0.0019 -0.0131 
(0.0091) (0.0094) (0.0131) (0.0190) (0.0196) (0.0200) 
Union/standbya 0.3992 0.4013 0.0021 0.0025 0.0015 -0.0109 
(0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0151) (0.0219) (0.0227) (0.0231) 
Occupation 
professional 0.0754 0.0885 0.0131 -0.0020 -0.0076 0.0020 
(0.0056) (0.0063) (0.0085) (0.0124) (0.0127) (0.0129) 
clerical 0.1392 0.1283 -0.0109 0.0008 -0.0016 0.0078 
(0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0105) (0.0152) (0.0158) (0.0164) 
sales 0.0548 0.0517 -0.0031 0.0025 0.0048 -0.0001 
(0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0069) (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0106) 
service 0.1006 0.1109 0.0103 0.0071 0.0129 0.0126 
(0.0064) (0.0070) (0.0095) (0.0138) (0.0143) (0.0144) 
agric., fishery, forestry 0.0278 0.0239 -0.0040 0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0002 
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0049) (0.0070) (0.0073) (0.0073) 
processing 0.0382 0.0338 -0.0044 -0.0047 -0.0039 -0.0054 
(0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0057) (0.0085) (0.0088) (0.0089) 
machine trades 0.0786 0.0746 -0.0040 -0.0015 -0.0005 -0.0108 
(0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0082) (0.0119) (0.0123) (0.0126) 
benchwork 0.0557 0.0582 0.0025 -0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0043 








Difference in differences between control
Claim year and JSA groups (year t  – claim year) 
Difference 
(treatment
Control mean JSA mean – control) Year 3 Year 6 Year 9 
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
structural work 0.2717 0.2740 0.0023 0.0019 0.0072 0.0023 
(0.0094) (0.0099) (0.0137) (0.0200) (0.0206) (0.0211) 
miscellaneous 0.1513 0.1437 -0.0076 -0.0045 -0.0069 -0.0005 
(0.0076) (0.0078) (0.0109) (0.0158) (0.0165) (0.0169) 
Industry 
agriculture 0.0211 0.0224 0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0031 
(0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0045) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0067) 
mining 0.0022 0.0005 -0.0017 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0007 
(0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0017) 
construction 0.2142 0.2014 -0.0128 -0.0088 -0.0021 -0.0128 
(0.0087) (0.0089) (0.0125) (0.0181) (0.0187) (0.0191) 
manufacturing 0.2335 0.2302 -0.0033 -0.0062 -0.0138 -0.0066 
(0.0090) (0.0094) (0.0130) (0.0189) (0.0195) (0.0199) 
transportation, utilities 0.0476 0.0532 0.0056 -0.0006 0.0013 -0.0009 
(0.0045) (0.0050) (0.0067) (0.0099) (0.0102) (0.0106) 
wholesale trade 0.0606 0.0487 -0.0119 0.0026 0.0001 0.0031 
(0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0070) (0.0103) (0.0109) (0.0110) 
retail trade 0.1576 0.1492 -0.0084 0.0027 0.0007 0.0050 
(0.0077) (0.0079) (0.0111) (0.0162) (0.0167) (0.0170) 
finance, ins., real estate 0.0269 0.0323 0.0054 -0.0004 0.0005 0.0034 
(0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0052) (0.0075) (0.0079) (0.0080) 
services 0.1720 0.1830 0.0110 0.0074 0.0100 0.0072 
(0.0080) (0.0086) (0.0118) (0.0171) (0.0177) (0.0181) 
government 0.0471 0.0607 0.0135 0.0021 0.0057 0.0022 
(0.0045) (0.0053) (0.0070) (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0108) 
unclassified 0.0171 0.0184 0.0013 0.0024 -0.0001 0.0032 
(0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0064) 
Reason for job loss
permanent layoff 0.1652 0.1507 -0.0146 0.0003 0.0072 0.0071 
(0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0112) (0.0163) (0.0169) (0.0172) 
temporary layoff 0.2236 0.2372 0.0136 0.0046 0.0081 -0.0039 
(0.0088) (0.0095) (0.0130) (0.0188) (0.0195) (0.0199) 
contract/seasonal 0.1702 0.1546 -0.0155 -0.0113 -0.0154 -0.0028 
(0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0113) (0.0164) (0.0169) (0.0173) 
quit 0.1608 0.1726 0.0118 0.0095 0.0105 0.0131 
(0.0078) (0.0084) (0.0115) (0.0168) (0.0174) (0.0178) 
missing 0.2802 0.2849 0.0047 -0.0031 -0.0104 -0.0136 
(0.0095) (0.0101) (0.0139) (0.0202) (0.0210) (0.0214) 
Prior claim 
none 0.7912 0.7892 -0.0020 0.0053 0.0004 0.0128 
(0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0125) (0.0182) (0.0188) (0.0191) 
duration ≤ 15 weeks 0.1078 0.0970 -0.0108 -0.0016 0.0031 0.0009 
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0093) (0.0135) (0.0141) (0.0143) 
duration > 15 weeks 0.1010 0.1139 0.0128 -0.0037 -0.0035 -0.0137 







Difference in differences between control
Claim year and JSA groups (year t  – claim year) 
Difference 
(treatment
Control mean JSA mean – control) Year 3 Year 6 Year 9 
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
UI benefits/claim type 
weekly amount ($) 148.77 148.46 -0.31 -1.17 -1.74 -0.13 
(1.05) (1.10) (1.52) (2.20) (2.28) (2.31) 
maximum amount ($) 3,956.8 3,920.7 -36.1 -58.5 -74.1 -1.9 
(35.9) (37.4) (51.8) (75.2) (77.9) (79.3) 
potential benefit duration 26.172 26.059 -0.113 -0.175 -0.227 -0.001
 (weeks) (0.102) (0.112) (0.151) (0.219) (0.227) (0.232) 
replacement rate (percent)b 61.052 61.425 0.373 -0.129 0.586 -0.377 
(0.459) (0.486) (0.668) (0.970) (1.006) (1.024) 
combined wage claimc 0.0431 0.0502 0.0071 -0.0031 -0.0042 0.0012 
(0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0065) (0.0093) (0.0095) (0.0099) 
ex-service member claim 0.0265 0.0368 0.0103 0.0033 0.0058 0.0017 
(0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0054) (0.0077) (0.0080) (0.0082) 
federal employee claim 0.0184 0.0139 -0.0045 0.0014 0.0041 0.0059 
(0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0039) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0058) 
Reservation wage (hourly) 
≤ $5.00 0.1715 0.1626 -0.0089 0.0076 0.0071 0.0072 
(0.0080) (0.0082) (0.0115) (0.0166) (0.0171) (0.0174) 
$5.01–$7.00 0.1392 0.1546 0.0154 -0.0032 0.0027 0.0112 
(0.0073) (0.0081) (0.0109) (0.0159) (0.0165) (0.0170) 
$7.01–$10.00 0.1581 0.1621 0.0040 -0.0085 -0.0044 -0.0075 
(0.0077) (0.0082) (0.0113) (0.0165) (0.0172) (0.0175) 
$10.01–$20.00 0.1464 0.1283 -0.0181 -0.0029 -0.0116 -0.0122 
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0106) (0.0153) (0.0158) (0.0162) 
> $20.00 0.0925 0.0816 -0.0109 0.0043 0.0072 0.0068 
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0087) (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0131) 
Pre-claim earnings ($) 
3 years before 10,870 10,610 -260 61 143 322 
(244) (261) (358) (518) (537) (554) 
2 years before 12,097 11,951 -146 -199 -151 1 
(238) (248) (344) (500) (518) (528) 
1 year before 14,241 14,095 -146 -155 -212 242 
(208) (222) (304) (444) (460) (469) 
Pre-claim hours 
3 years before 950.1 920.4 -29.7 8.6 3.9 14.4 
(16.9) (17.4) (24.3) (35.3) (36.5) (37.2) 
2 years before 1,101.9 1,089.2 -12.7 -5.7 -8.3 9.9 
(15.9) (16.6) (23.0) (33.5) (34.7) (35.4) 
1 year before 1,345.0 1,322.0 -22.9 17.5 9.8 30.1 
(13.7) (15.1) (20.4) (29.6) (30.7) (31.3) 
Pre-claim earnings variability 
annual (CV) 0.6418 0.6393 -0.0025 -0.0027 0.0102 0.0044 
(0.0110) (0.0115) (0.0159) (0.0230) (0.0237) (0.0242) 
seasonal (CV) 0.5709 0.5837 0.0128 -0.0077 0.0027 -0.0066 












Difference in differences between control
















Quarters earnings >0 8.8572 8.7126 -0.1446 -0.0332 -0.0816 -0.0107 
in 12 pre-claim quarters (0.0698) (0.0750) (0.1025) (0.1482) (0.1529) (0.1555) 
< 6 0.1886 0.1890 0.0004 0.0045 0.0063 -0.0008 
(0.0083) (0.0087) (0.0120) (0.0175) (0.0179) (0.0182) 
6–8 0.1796 0.1934 0.0138 -0.0007 0.0031 0.0076 
(0.0081) (0.0088) (0.0120) (0.0174) (0.0180) (0.0184) 
> 8 0.6318 0.6176 -0.0142 -0.0038 -0.0095 -0.0068 
Pre-claim drop in earnings 
(0.0102) (0.0108) (0.0149) (0.0216) (0.0224) (0.0228) 
between pre-claim year 3 0.3426 0.3317 -0.0109 0.0059 0.0030 0.0043
 and pre-clam year 2 (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0145) (0.0212) (0.0219) (0.0223) 
between pre-claim year 2 0.3345 0.3158 -0.0188 0.0001 0.0030 -0.0007
 and pre-clam year 1 (0.0100) (0.0104) (0.0144) (0.0210) (0.0217) (0.0222) 
Claimants with earnings >0 
Control groupd 2,227 n/a 2,227 1,999 1,749 1,629 
JSA group n/a 2,011 2,011 1,798 1,585 1,474 
Source: See Table 1. 
Bold indicates p -value < .05 for test of difference between control and JSA groups (column 3). 
Italic  indicates p -value < .10 for test of difference between control and JSA groups (column 3). 
a. Claimants were not required to search for work or participate in JSA if their job placement was handled by a union, or if
they were on layoff with a set recall date. 
b. Weekly benefit amount as a percentage of pre-claim average weekly earnings.
c. Combined wage claims use earnings from more than one state to calculate base period earnings.
d. The size of the control group in this table differs from size reported in Tables A-1, A-3, and A-4 because we drop claimants














Characteristics of controls and Exception Reporting (ER) claimants with earnings in claim year, and
 
differences in differences between controls and ER claimants (subsequent years against claim year)
 
(standard errors in parentheses)
 
Difference in differences between control
Claim year and ER groups (year t  – claim year) 
Difference 
(treatment
Control mean ER mean – control) Year 3 Year 6 Year 9 
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male 0.6935 0.7282 0.0347 -0.0139 -0.0190 -0.0170 
(0.0093) (0.0102) (0.0138) (0.0202) (0.0209) (0.0214) 
Age (years) 
≤ 24 0.2145 0.2078 -0.0068 -0.0042 -0.0058 0.0077 
(0.0083) (0.0093) (0.0125) (0.0181) (0.0188) (0.0194) 
25-34 0.3723 0.4145 0.0422 -0.0066 -0.0200 -0.0217 
(0.0098) (0.0113) (0.0149) (0.0218) (0.0225) (0.0231) 
35-44 0.2489 0.2183 -0.0306 0.0097 0.0128 0.0063 
(0.0087) (0.0095) (0.0129) (0.0189) (0.0195) (0.0201) 
45-54 0.1136 0.1097 -0.0040 -0.0029 0.0043 0.0091 
(0.0064) (0.0072) (0.0096) (0.0141) (0.0143) (0.0143) 
≥ 54 0.0507 0.0498 -0.0008 0.0040 0.0087 -0.0015 
(0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0067) (0.0094) (0.0088) (0.0082) 
Gender-age interactions 
male ≤ 24 0.1438 0.1401 -0.0038 0.0002 -0.0018 0.0063 
(0.0071) (0.0080) (0.0107) (0.0155) (0.0162) (0.0167) 
male 25-34 0.2726 0.3164 0.0438 -0.0125 -0.0228 -0.0226 
(0.0090) (0.0107) (0.0140) (0.0203) (0.0210) (0.0217) 
male 35-44 0.1626 0.1480 -0.0147 0.0020 0.0026 0.0033 
(0.0075) (0.0081) (0.0110) (0.0161) (0.0166) (0.0171) 
male 45-54 0.0756 0.0850 0.0094 -0.0085 -0.0039 -0.0047 
(0.0053) (0.0064) (0.0083) (0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0122) 
male ≥ 54 0.0388 0.0388 0.0000 0.0048 0.0069 0.0006 
(0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0059) (0.0082) (0.0076) (0.0071) 
female ≤ 24 0.0707 0.0677 -0.0030 -0.0044 -0.0040 0.0014 
(0.0052) (0.0058) (0.0077) (0.0112) (0.0116) (0.0119) 
female 25-34 0.0997 0.0981 -0.0016 0.0059 0.0027 0.0009 
(0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0091) (0.0133) (0.0139) (0.0143) 
female 35-44 0.0862 0.0703 -0.0159 0.0076 0.0102 0.0031 
(0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0082) (0.0121) (0.0126) (0.0129) 
female 45-54 0.0380 0.0247 -0.0133 0.0055 0.0082 0.0138 
(0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0053) (0.0078) (0.0080) (0.0080) 
female ≥ 54 0.0119 0.0110 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0017 -0.0021 
(0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0042) 
Ethnicity 
white 0.8255 0.8221 -0.0034 -0.0115 0.0039 -0.0088 
(0.0077) (0.0088) (0.0116) (0.0168) (0.0172) (0.0178) 
black 0.0993 0.1070 0.0077 0.0086 -0.0096 0.0076 
(0.0060) (0.0071) (0.0093) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0140) 







Difference in differences between control
Claim year and ER groups (year t  – claim year) 
Difference 
(treatment
Control mean ER mean – control) Year 3 Year 6 Year 9 
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(0.0053) (0.0059) (0.0079) (0.0115) (0.0120) (0.0123) 
Schooling (years) 
less than high school 0.1406 0.1196 -0.0210 0.0007 -0.0012 0.0018 
(0.0070) (0.0074) (0.0102) (0.0148) (0.0151) (0.0154) 
high school 0.5386 0.5525 0.0138 0.0007 0.0059 0.0014 
(0.0101) (0.0114) (0.0152) (0.0222) (0.0229) (0.0234) 
some college 0.2395 0.2508 0.0113 -0.0030 -0.0038 -0.0074 
(0.0086) (0.0099) (0.0132) (0.0192) (0.0198) (0.0202) 
college graduate 0.0813 0.0771 -0.0042 0.0016 -0.0009 0.0042 
(0.0055) (0.0061) (0.0082) (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0130) 
Marital status/gender 
married male 0.2628 0.2712 0.0085 -0.0166 -0.0154 -0.0253 
(0.0089) (0.0102) (0.0135) (0.0196) (0.0202) (0.0206) 
married female 0.0960 0.0771 -0.0189 0.0040 0.0093 0.0126 
(0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0085) (0.0123) (0.0128) (0.0130) 
Household status 
no dependents 0.3102 0.3106 0.0004 0.0064 0.0176 0.0141 
(0.0094) (0.0106) (0.0141) (0.0206) (0.0212) (0.0216) 
1 dependent 0.1524 0.1516 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0039 0.0005 
(0.0073) (0.0082) (0.0110) (0.0160) (0.0166) (0.0170) 
2 or more dependents 0.2321 0.2356 0.0035 -0.0024 -0.0087 -0.0124 
(0.0085) (0.0097) (0.0129) (0.0189) (0.0194) (0.0200) 
homeowner 0.2857 0.2796 -0.0060 0.0098 0.0212 0.0071 
(0.0091) (0.0103) (0.0138) (0.0200) (0.0207) (0.0211) 
Veteran 0.2342 0.2324 -0.0017 -0.0072 -0.0018 -0.0205 
(0.0086) (0.0097) (0.0129) (0.0188) (0.0193) (0.0197) 
Union/standbya 0.3727 0.3274 -0.0453 0.0105 0.0149 0.0130 
(0.0098) (0.0108) (0.0145) (0.0212) (0.0218) (0.0224) 
Occupation 
professional 0.0732 0.0735 0.0003 0.0032 0.0016 0.0091 
(0.0053) (0.0060) (0.0080) (0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0124) 
clerical 0.1381 0.1343 -0.0038 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0011 
(0.0070) (0.0078) (0.0105) (0.0153) (0.0159) (0.0163) 
sales 0.0552 0.0567 0.0015 -0.0024 0.0011 -0.0024 
(0.0046) (0.0053) (0.0070) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0107) 
service 0.1103 0.0855 -0.0248 0.0061 0.0074 0.0101 
(0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0090) (0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0135) 
agric., fishery, forestry 0.0262 0.0231 -0.0031 0.0002 -0.0008 0.0040 
(0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0047) (0.0067) (0.0070) (0.0072) 
processing 0.0364 0.0357 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0065 
(0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0057) (0.0085) (0.0087) (0.0088) 
machine trades 0.0826 0.0892 0.0066 0.0011 -0.0049 -0.0044 
(0.0056) (0.0065) (0.0086) (0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0134) 
benchwork 0.0568 0.0593 0.0025 0.0040 0.0015 -0.0012 








Difference in differences between control
Claim year and ER groups (year t  – claim year) 
Difference 
(treatment
Control mean ER mean – control) Year 3 Year 6 Year 9 
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
structural work 0.2628 0.2907 0.0279 -0.0127 0.0064 -0.0043 
(0.0089) (0.0104) (0.0137) (0.0199) (0.0205) (0.0211) 
miscellaneous 0.1512 0.1459 -0.0054 0.0017 -0.0094 -0.0027 
(0.0072) (0.0081) (0.0109) (0.0158) (0.0164) (0.0168) 
Industry 
agriculture 0.0204 0.0220 0.0016 -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0030 
(0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0044) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0066) 
mining 0.0020 0.0005 -0.0015 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0000 
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0017) 
construction 0.2084 0.2030 -0.0054 -0.0062 0.0100 -0.0008 
(0.0082) (0.0092) (0.0123) (0.0179) (0.0186) (0.0190) 
manufacturing 0.2272 0.2450 0.0178 0.0036 0.0001 0.0033 
(0.0085) (0.0099) (0.0130) (0.0190) (0.0196) (0.0201) 
transportation, utilities 0.0466 0.0540 0.0075 -0.0070 -0.0073 -0.0067 
(0.0043) (0.0052) (0.0067) (0.0097) (0.0099) (0.0103) 
wholesale trade 0.0597 0.0588 -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0072 -0.0030 
(0.0048) (0.0054) (0.0072) (0.0105) (0.0110) (0.0113) 
retail trade 0.1655 0.1558 -0.0097 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0004 
(0.0075) (0.0083) (0.0112) (0.0163) (0.0169) (0.0172) 
finance, ins., real estate 0.0262 0.0294 0.0032 -0.0012 -0.0015 0.0002 
(0.0032) (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0072) (0.0075) (0.0077) 
services 0.1778 0.1626 -0.0151 0.0156 0.0076 0.0130 
(0.0077) (0.0085) (0.0115) (0.0168) (0.0172) (0.0177) 
government 0.0499 0.0504 0.0005 -0.0024 -0.0018 -0.0023 
(0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0067) (0.0096) (0.0098) (0.0102) 
unclassified 0.0163 0.0184 0.0020 0.0002 0.0019 -0.0003 
(0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0059) (0.0062) (0.0061) 
Reason for job loss
permanent layoff 0.1631 0.1511 -0.0120 -0.0009 0.0030 0.0178 
(0.0075) (0.0082) (0.0111) (0.0162) (0.0166) (0.0172) 
temporary layoff 0.2182 0.2513 0.0331 0.0063 0.0116 -0.0031 
(0.0084) (0.0099) (0.0130) (0.0189) (0.0195) (0.0199) 
contract/seasonal 0.1663 0.1584 -0.0079 0.0001 -0.0034 -0.0046 
(0.0075) (0.0084) (0.0113) (0.0164) (0.0169) (0.0172) 
quit 0.1716 0.1689 -0.0027 0.0031 0.0101 0.0011 
(0.0076) (0.0086) (0.0115) (0.0168) (0.0173) (0.0177) 
missing 0.2808 0.2702 -0.0106 -0.0085 -0.0214 -0.0112 
(0.0091) (0.0102) (0.0136) (0.0198) (0.0205) (0.0210) 
Prior claim 
none 0.8002 0.7943 -0.0058 0.0021 -0.0011 0.0034 
(0.0081) (0.0093) (0.0123) (0.0179) (0.0184) (0.0189) 
duration ≤ 15 weeks 0.1034 0.0986 -0.0048 0.0024 -0.0019 -0.0041 
(0.0062) (0.0068) (0.0092) (0.0134) (0.0138) (0.0140) 
duration > 15 weeks 0.0964 0.1070 0.0106 -0.0045 0.0030 0.0007 







Difference in differences between control
Claim year and ER groups (year t  – claim year) 
Difference 
(treatment
Control mean ER mean – control) Year 3 Year 6 Year 9 
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
UI benefits/claim type 
weekly amount ($) 146.77 148.28 1.52 -0.80 -1.32 -1.63 
(1.03) (1.13) (1.52) (2.21) (2.28) (2.33) 
maximum amount ($) 3,888.1 3,943.0 54.9 -6.7 -37.2 -24.9 
(34.9) (38.3) (51.8) (75.4) (77.7) (79.6) 
potential benefit duration 26.023 26.203 0.180 0.072 -0.034 0.097
 (weeks) (0.100) (0.112) (0.150) (0.215) (0.221) (0.228) 
replacement rate (percent)b 61.197 60.188 -1.008 -0.369 0.132 -0.063 
(0.440) (0.492) (0.660) (0.960) (0.987) (1.013) 
combined wage claimc 0.0454 0.0414 -0.0039 0.0022 0.0028 0.0064 
(0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0062) (0.0089) (0.0093) (0.0095) 
ex-service member claim 0.0298 0.0299 0.0001 -0.0045 -0.0004 -0.0021 
(0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0052) (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0076) 
federal employee claim 0.0168 0.0152 -0.0015 -0.0009 0.0006 0.0043 
(0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0038) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0057) 
Reservation wage (hourly) 
≤ $5.00 0.1814 0.1626 -0.0188 0.0104 0.0088 0.0105 
(0.0078) (0.0085) (0.0115) (0.0167) (0.0172) (0.0175) 
$5.01–$7.00 0.1373 0.1553 0.0180 -0.0043 0.0060 -0.0049 
(0.0070) (0.0083) (0.0108) (0.0159) (0.0164) (0.0168) 
$7.01–$10.00 0.1532 0.1668 0.0136 -0.0022 -0.0047 -0.0101 
(0.0073) (0.0085) (0.0112) (0.0164) (0.0170) (0.0173) 
$10.01–$20.00 0.1406 0.1443 0.0037 -0.0023 -0.0027 -0.0109 
(0.0070) (0.0081) (0.0107) (0.0155) (0.0160) (0.0164) 
> $20.00 0.0919 0.1049 0.0130 0.0042 0.0124 0.0179 
(0.0058) (0.0070) (0.0091) (0.0133) (0.0137) (0.0141) 
Pre-claim earnings ($) 
3 years before 10,669 11,160 491 312 77 112 
(232) (271) (357) (519) (531) (546) 
2 years before 11,919 12,188 269 43 -157 -111 
(228) (260) (345) (504) (517) (533) 
1 year before 14,073 14,204 131 97 -180 -37 
(200) (230) (305) (448) (457) (469) 
Pre-claim hours 
3 years before 939.1 950.0 11.0 18.6 0.4 0.3 
(16.1) (18.1) (24.3) (35.3) (36.3) (37.2) 
2 years before 1,095.2 1,095.4 0.2 4.9 -8.4 -9.7 
(15.2) (17.2) (23.0) (33.4) (34.5) (35.3) 
1 year before 1,340.7 1,350.3 9.6 13.8 4.7 8.9 
(13.2) (15.3) (20.2) (29.2) (30.1) (30.9) 
Pre-claim earnings variability 
annual (CV) 0.6470 0.6304 -0.0166 -0.0079 0.0037 0.0055 
(0.0106) (0.0120) (0.0160) (0.0231) (0.0237) (0.0243) 
seasonal (CV) 0.5729 0.5671 -0.0057 -0.0083 0.0018 0.0066 














Difference in differences between control
















Quarters earnings >0 8.8038 8.7844 -0.0195 0.0687 -0.0390 -0.0067 
in 12 pre-claim quarters (0.0670) (0.0771) (0.1021) (0.1474) (0.1517) (0.1546) 
< 6 0.1913 0.2020 0.0107 -0.0096 -0.0040 -0.0039 
(0.0080) (0.0092) (0.0122) (0.0175) (0.0179) (0.0184) 
6–8 0.1843 0.1742 -0.0101 0.0012 0.0075 0.0157 
(0.0078) (0.0087) (0.0117) (0.0170) (0.0177) (0.0181) 
> 8 0.6244 0.6238 -0.0006 0.0084 -0.0036 -0.0118 
(0.0098) (0.0111) (0.0148) (0.0215) (0.0222) (0.0227) 
Pre-claim drop in earnings 
between pre-claim year 3 0.3367 0.3410 0.0043 0.0114 0.0089 0.0147
 and pre-clam year 2 (0.0096) (0.0109) (0.0145) (0.0211) (0.0218) (0.0223) 
between pre-claim year 2 0.3327 0.3358 0.0031 0.0051 0.0021 -0.0002
 and pre-clam year 1 (0.0095) (0.0108) (0.0144) (0.0210) (0.0217) (0.0223) 
Claimants with earnings >0 
Control group 2,447 n/a 2,447 2,195 1,930 1,785 
ER group n/a 1,906 1,906 1,692 1,522 1,388 
Source: See Table 1. 
Bold indicates p -value < .05 for test of difference between control and ER groups (column 3). 
Italic  indicates p -value < .10 for test of difference between control and ER groups (column 3), or for test of difference in 
differences between control and ER groups (year t  – claim year) (column 6). 




ER claimants did not need to submit continued claims, so there was no reason to record their union/standby status.
 
b. Weekly benefit amount as a percentage of pre-claim average weekly earnings.
 














Characteristics of controls and New Work Search (NWS) claimants with earnings in claim year, and
differences in differences between controls and NWS claimants (subsequent years against claim year) 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Difference in differences between control
Claim year and NWS groups (year t  – claim year) 
Difference 
(treatment
Control mean NWS mean – control) Year 3 Year 6 Year 9 
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male 0.6935 0.7089 0.0154 -0.0086 -0.0119 -0.0176 
(0.0093) (0.0109) (0.0144) (0.0210) (0.0219) (0.0224) 
Age (years) 
≤ 24 0.2145 0.2072 -0.0074 0.0006 0.0005 -0.0027 
(0.0083) (0.0098) (0.0128) (0.0187) (0.0195) (0.0200) 
25-34 0.3723 0.3953 0.0230 -0.0027 -0.0133 -0.0050 
(0.0098) (0.0118) (0.0153) (0.0224) (0.0233) (0.0239) 
35-44 0.2489 0.2292 -0.0197 -0.0030 0.0063 -0.0007 
(0.0087) (0.0101) (0.0134) (0.0195) (0.0203) (0.0209) 
45-54 0.1136 0.1128 -0.0008 0.0029 0.0054 0.0146 
(0.0064) (0.0076) (0.0100) (0.0147) (0.0150) (0.0151) 
≥ 54 0.0507 0.0556 0.0049 0.0021 0.0011 -0.0062 
(0.0044) (0.0055) (0.0071) (0.0100) (0.0092) (0.0087) 
Gender-age interactions 
male ≤ 24 0.1438 0.1453 0.0014 -0.0029 -0.0052 -0.0081 
(0.0071) (0.0085) (0.0111) (0.0161) (0.0168) (0.0173) 
male 25-34 0.2726 0.2870 0.0145 -0.0049 -0.0100 -0.0072 
(0.0090) (0.0109) (0.0141) (0.0207) (0.0216) (0.0223) 
male 35-44 0.1626 0.1534 -0.0093 -0.0027 0.0070 0.0050 
(0.0075) (0.0087) (0.0114) (0.0167) (0.0174) (0.0179) 
male 45-54 0.0756 0.0799 0.0043 -0.0028 -0.0043 -0.0012 
(0.0053) (0.0065) (0.0084) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
male ≥ 54 0.0388 0.0434 0.0046 0.0047 0.0006 -0.0061 
(0.0039) (0.0049) (0.0063) (0.0088) (0.0080) (0.0074) 
female ≤ 24 0.0707 0.0619 -0.0088 0.0036 0.0057 0.0054 
(0.0052) (0.0058) (0.0078) (0.0115) (0.0120) (0.0122) 
female 25-34 0.0997 0.1082 0.0085 0.0022 -0.0033 0.0022 
(0.0061) (0.0075) (0.0096) (0.0140) (0.0147) (0.0152) 
female 35-44 0.0862 0.0758 -0.0104 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0057 
(0.0057) (0.0064) (0.0085) (0.0125) (0.0130) (0.0134) 
female 45-54 0.0380 0.0330 -0.0050 0.0057 0.0097 0.0159 
(0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0058) (0.0086) (0.0089) (0.0090) 
female ≥ 54 0.0119 0.0122 0.0003 -0.0026 0.0005 -0.0001 
(0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0047) 
Ethnicity 
white 0.8255 0.8264 0.0009 -0.0078 0.0002 0.0020 
(0.0077) (0.0091) (0.0119) (0.0172) (0.0178) (0.0182) 
black 0.0993 0.0926 -0.0067 0.0100 0.0019 0.0054 
(0.0060) (0.0070) (0.0092) (0.0133) (0.0137) (0.0139) 







Difference in differences between control
Claim year and NWS groups (year t  – claim year) 
Difference 
(treatment
Control mean NWS mean – control) Year 3 Year 6 Year 9 
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(0.0053) (0.0066) (0.0085) (0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0130) 
Schooling (years) 
less than high school 0.1406 0.1348 -0.0057 -0.0008 -0.0085 -0.0113 
(0.0070) (0.0082) (0.0108) (0.0157) (0.0160) (0.0162) 
high school 0.5386 0.5347 -0.0039 0.0066 0.0035 -0.0094 
(0.0101) (0.0120) (0.0157) (0.0229) (0.0237) (0.0243) 
some college 0.2395 0.2494 0.0099 -0.0002 0.0076 0.0178 
(0.0086) (0.0104) (0.0135) (0.0198) (0.0206) (0.0212) 
college graduate 0.0813 0.0810 -0.0003 -0.0057 -0.0026 0.0029 
(0.0055) (0.0066) (0.0086) (0.0125) (0.0130) (0.0136) 
Marital status/gender 
married male 0.2628 0.2483 -0.0145 -0.0041 -0.0001 -0.0093 
(0.0089) (0.0104) (0.0137) (0.0200) (0.0207) (0.0211) 
married female 0.0960 0.0880 -0.0081 0.0111 0.0212 0.0151 
(0.0060) (0.0068) (0.0091) (0.0133) (0.0139) (0.0140) 
Household status 
no dependents 0.3102 0.2975 -0.0127 0.0039 0.0056 0.0101 
(0.0094) (0.0110) (0.0144) (0.0211) (0.0217) (0.0222) 
1 dependent 0.1524 0.1667 0.0142 0.0007 0.0046 -0.0004 
(0.0073) (0.0090) (0.0115) (0.0169) (0.0176) (0.0180) 
2 or more dependents 0.2321 0.2187 -0.0134 -0.0003 0.0024 -0.0003 
(0.0085) (0.0099) (0.0131) (0.0192) (0.0199) (0.0206) 
homeowner 0.2857 0.2541 -0.0316 0.0095 0.0214 0.0172 
(0.0091) (0.0105) (0.0139) (0.0203) (0.0211) (0.0215) 
Veteran 0.2342 0.2465 0.0124 -0.0125 -0.0045 -0.0206 
(0.0086) (0.0104) (0.0134) (0.0196) (0.0202) (0.0207) 
Union/standby 0.3727 0.3767 0.0040 0.0037 0.0111 -0.0016 
(0.0098) (0.0117) (0.0152) (0.0222) (0.0230) (0.0236) 
Occupation 
professional 0.0732 0.0666 -0.0066 -0.0048 -0.0001 0.0085 
(0.0053) (0.0060) (0.0080) (0.0117) (0.0122) (0.0125) 
clerical 0.1381 0.1273 -0.0108 0.0038 0.0034 -0.0033 
(0.0070) (0.0080) (0.0106) (0.0156) (0.0163) (0.0166) 
sales 0.0552 0.0503 -0.0048 0.0009 0.0002 0.0024 
(0.0046) (0.0053) (0.0070) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0109) 
service 0.1103 0.1227 0.0123 0.0013 0.0032 0.0129 
(0.0063) (0.0079) (0.0101) (0.0146) (0.0152) (0.0154) 
agric., fishery, forestry 0.0262 0.0231 -0.0030 0.0016 0.0001 0.0011 
(0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0048) (0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0074) 
processing 0.0364 0.0347 -0.0016 -0.0055 -0.0072 -0.0037 
(0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0058) (0.0085) (0.0087) (0.0091) 
machine trades 0.0826 0.0874 0.0048 0.0028 0.0014 -0.0026 
(0.0056) (0.0068) (0.0088) (0.0129) (0.0133) (0.0138) 
benchwork 0.0568 0.0625 0.0057 0.0046 0.0063 0.0043 








Difference in differences between control
Claim year and NWS groups (year t  – claim year) 
Difference 
(treatment
Control mean NWS mean – control) Year 3 Year 6 Year 9 
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
structural work 0.2628 0.2812 0.0185 -0.0092 0.0011 -0.0234 
(0.0089) (0.0108) (0.0140) (0.0204) (0.0211) (0.0216) 
miscellaneous 0.1512 0.1343 -0.0169 0.0057 -0.0062 0.0061 
(0.0072) (0.0082) (0.0109) (0.0161) (0.0166) (0.0172) 
Industry 
agriculture 0.0204 0.0197 -0.0008 0.0021 0.0008 0.0014 
(0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0044) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0069) 
mining 0.0020 0.0023 0.0003 0.0006 0.0007 -0.0000 
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0023) 
construction 0.2084 0.1840 -0.0244 0.0004 0.0018 -0.0108 
(0.0082) (0.0093) (0.0124) (0.0182) (0.0187) (0.0192) 
manufacturing 0.2272 0.2517 0.0245 -0.0038 -0.0011 0.0012 
(0.0085) (0.0104) (0.0134) (0.0197) (0.0204) (0.0209) 
transportation, utilities 0.0466 0.0428 -0.0038 -0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0025 
(0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0065) (0.0095) (0.0098) (0.0102) 
wholesale trade 0.0597 0.0480 -0.0116 0.0062 0.0013 0.0038 
(0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0070) (0.0105) (0.0111) (0.0113) 
retail trade 0.1655 0.1615 -0.0041 -0.0042 -0.0080 0.0003 
(0.0075) (0.0089) (0.0116) (0.0169) (0.0175) (0.0180) 
finance, ins., real estate 0.0262 0.0301 0.0039 0.0042 0.0027 -0.0011 
(0.0032) (0.0041) (0.0052) (0.0077) (0.0080) (0.0079) 
services 0.1778 0.1875 0.0097 0.0018 0.0051 0.0128 
(0.0077) (0.0094) (0.0122) (0.0177) (0.0184) (0.0189) 
government 0.0499 0.0538 0.0040 -0.0018 -0.0006 -0.0066 
(0.0044) (0.0054) (0.0070) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0106) 
unclassified 0.0163 0.0185 0.0022 -0.0035 -0.0011 0.0016 
(0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0041) (0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0065) 
Reason for job loss
permanent layoff 0.1631 0.1534 -0.0097 -0.0043 0.0026 0.0005 
(0.0075) (0.0087) (0.0114) (0.0167) (0.0173) (0.0177) 
temporary layoff 0.2182 0.2216 0.0034 0.0037 0.0031 -0.0026 
(0.0084) (0.0100) (0.0130) (0.0190) (0.0196) (0.0201) 
contract/seasonal 0.1663 0.1551 -0.0112 -0.0051 -0.0066 -0.0017 
(0.0075) (0.0087) (0.0115) (0.0168) (0.0173) (0.0178) 
quit 0.1716 0.1771 0.0054 0.0099 0.0079 0.0102 
(0.0076) (0.0092) (0.0119) (0.0176) (0.0181) (0.0187) 
missing 0.2808 0.2928 0.0121 -0.0042 -0.0071 -0.0064 
(0.0091) (0.0110) (0.0142) (0.0208) (0.0216) (0.0222) 
Prior claim 
none 0.8002 0.7882 -0.0120 0.0004 -0.0035 -0.0045 
(0.0081) (0.0098) (0.0127) (0.0186) (0.0193) (0.0198) 
duration ≤ 15 weeks 0.1034 0.1007 -0.0027 0.0028 -0.0002 0.0093 
(0.0062) (0.0072) (0.0095) (0.0139) (0.0144) (0.0149) 
duration > 15 weeks 0.0964 0.1111 0.0147 -0.0031 0.0037 -0.0047 







Difference in differences between control
Claim year and NWS groups (year t  – claim year) 
Difference 
(treatment
Control mean NWS mean – control) Year 3 Year 6 Year 9 
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
UI benefits/claim type 
weekly amount ($) 146.77 145.82 -0.95 -0.71 -0.37 -0.97 
(1.03) (1.22) (1.59) (2.32) (2.40) (2.46) 
maximum amount ($) 3,888.1 3,839.1 -49.0 -23.6 -19.8 -13.7 
(34.9) (41.5) (54.2) (79.0) (81.7) (84.0) 
potential benefit duration 26.023 25.840 -0.183 -0.009 -0.049 0.059
 (weeks) (0.100) (0.124) (0.159) (0.229) (0.236) (0.243) 
replacement rate (percent)a 61.197 62.020 0.823 0.155 -0.144 -0.547 
(0.440) (0.527) (0.687) (1.005) (1.035) (1.060) 
combined wage claimb 0.0454 0.0503 0.0050 -0.0008 -0.0043 -0.0081 
(0.0042) (0.0053) (0.0067) (0.0096) (0.0099) (0.0099) 
ex-service member claim 0.0298 0.0376 0.0078 -0.0026 0.0030 -0.0019 
(0.0034) (0.0046) (0.0057) (0.0081) (0.0083) (0.0085) 
federal employee claim 0.0168 0.0145 -0.0023 0.0015 0.0002 0.0033 
(0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0057) 
Reservation wage (hourly) 
≤ $5.00 0.1814 0.1748 -0.0067 0.0089 -0.0045 0.0015 
(0.0078) (0.0091) (0.0120) (0.0175) (0.0179) (0.0183) 
$5.01–$7.00 0.1373 0.1325 -0.0048 -0.0032 0.0051 0.0015 
(0.0070) (0.0082) (0.0107) (0.0158) (0.0163) (0.0169) 
$7.01–$10.00 0.1532 0.1649 0.0117 -0.0098 -0.0041 -0.0059 
(0.0073) (0.0089) (0.0115) (0.0168) (0.0176) (0.0180) 
$10.01–$20.00 0.1406 0.1279 -0.0127 0.0097 0.0096 0.0039 
(0.0070) (0.0080) (0.0107) (0.0157) (0.0163) (0.0168) 
> $20.00 0.0919 0.0966 0.0047 -0.0037 0.0005 0.0065 
(0.0058) (0.0071) (0.0092) (0.0133) (0.0137) (0.0141) 
Pre-claim earnings ($) 
3 years before 10,669 10,558 -111 40 85 106 
(232) (277) (362) (525) (542) (556) 
2 years before 11,919 11,576 -343 -201 45 -166 
(228) (263) (348) (507) (526) (537) 
1 year before 14,073 13,625 -448 -80 144 132 
(200) (235) (309) (453) (470) (479) 
Pre-claim hours 
3 years before 939.1 939.4 0.4 2.9 2.9 13.2 
(16.1) (19.3) (25.2) (36.7) (37.9) (38.8) 
2 years before 1,095.2 1,079.1 -16.1 -11.0 4.8 -4.7 
(15.2) (18.1) (23.6) (34.6) (35.7) (36.7) 
1 year before 1,340.7 1,299.2 -41.5 0.3 19.1 16.0 
(13.2) (16.1) (20.8) (30.4) (31.4) (32.2) 
Pre-claim earnings variability 
annual (CV) 0.6470 0.6496 0.0026 -0.0070 -0.0116 -0.0100 
(0.0106) (0.0126) (0.0165) (0.0240) (0.0246) (0.0253) 
seasonal (CV) 0.5729 0.5812 0.0083 0.0016 -0.0025 -0.0063 










Difference in differences between control
















Quarters earnings >0 8.8038 8.6973 -0.1065 0.0067 0.0706 0.0520 
in 12 pre-claim quarters (0.0670) (0.0813) (0.1053) (0.1529) (0.1573) (0.1618) 
< 6 0.1913 0.2083 0.0171 -0.0069 -0.0087 -0.0015 
(0.0080) (0.0098) (0.0126) (0.0183) (0.0187) (0.0192) 
6–8 0.1843 0.1777 -0.0066 0.0042 -0.0023 -0.0041 
(0.0078) (0.0092) (0.0121) (0.0177) (0.0183) (0.0186) 
> 8 0.6244 0.6140 -0.0104 0.0027 0.0110 0.0056 
(0.0098) (0.0117) (0.0153) (0.0223) (0.0230) (0.0235) 
Pre-claim drop in earnings 
between pre-claim year 3 0.3367 0.3437 0.0070 0.0023 -0.0078 0.0094
 and pre-clam year 2 (0.0096) (0.0114) (0.0149) (0.0218) (0.0226) (0.0232) 
between pre-claim year 2 0.3327 0.3362 0.0036 -0.0016 -0.0034 -0.0150
 and pre-clam year 1 (0.0095) (0.0114) (0.0148) (0.0217) (0.0224) (0.0230) 
Claimants with earnings >0 
Control group 2,447 n/a 2,447 2,195 1,930 1,785 
NWS group n/a 1,728 1,728 1,498 1,320 1,201 
Source: See Table 1. 
Bold indicates p -value < .05 for test of difference between control and NWS groups (column 3). 
Italic  indicates p -value < .10 for test of difference between control and NWS groups (column 3), or for test of difference in 
differences between control and NWS groups (year t  – claim year) (column 6). 
a. Weekly benefit amount as a percentage of pre-claim average weekly earnings.
b. Combined wage claims use earnings from more than one state to calculate base period earnings.
Table 4 
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